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Introduction 
‘Conflict early warning and response’ (EWR) was conceived as a means of preventing violent 
conflict in order to protect people’s life. Broadly two types of mechanisms can be 
distinguished: quantitative and qualitative models. The most explicit response mechanism 
exists with regard to humanitarian emergencies at the UN level; however the EWR 
mechanism is far from being efficient since the UN is a bureaucratic organisation with a ‘silo’ 
mentality among the different agencies and departments, and the UN Security Council is a 
highly politicised body. At the same time, only in recent years have regional organisations 
been charged with responding to crises and only now are they beginning to establish 
instruments (organs of peace and security) with a capacity to respond. 
EWR is being scrutinised today and questions are raised regarding the effectiveness of these 
tools. Two trends can be observed. Firstly, methodologies have improved. Most recently, for 
example, innovative proposals to combine both approaches have been put forward (Goldstone 
2008). The models applied by the Political Instability Task Force (PITF) meanwhile claim to 
have a predictive capacity of between 80 and 90 percent (Goldstone et al. 2005; Marshall 
2008). At the same time, however, the usefulness of specific systems that were unable to 
adapt to user needs and find their niche has waned (Schmeidl 2008, Barton and von Hippel 
2008), which can partly also be seen in the closing down of the Forum on Early Warning and 
Response (FEWER) and more recently Frühanalyse von Spannungen und 
Tatsachenermittlung (Early Recognition and Analysis of Tensions, FAST). Secondly, several 
regional organisations, especially in Africa, have engaged in establishing EWR mechanisms, 
partly on the insistence and with the assistance of donor organisations, while others, 
especially in Asia, have abstained from such commitments.  
However, a problem arises since all too often early warning systems do not result in early 
preventive action. Thus, it is time to evaluate to what extent empirical evidence confirms or 
questions the value of conflict EWR for effective practice. 
The purpose of this research paper is to present a systematic overview of existing key EWR 
mechanisms and to analyse whether, to what extent, and under what conditions these 
mechanisms might be a useful peace and security promotion tool for regional organisations. 
Our research questions are the following: 
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Senior Researcher at INEF. Prof. Dr. Tobias Debiel teaches international relations at the University of Duisburg-
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prevention, the state monopoly of force, UN peacekeeping and regional organisations. We gratefully 
acknowledge useful comments by Laurie Nathan, Howard Adelman, Patrick Meier and Susanne Schmeidl on an 
early version of this paper. 
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1. What are the strengths and weaknesses of the existing EWR mechanisms? 
2. Have they been put to appropriate use in predicting and preventing violent conflict by 
regional organisations? 
3. What is the experience of regional organisations in implementing EWR mechanisms? 
4. Why did some regional organisations abstain from establishing such mechanisms?  
5. Can regional organisations capitalise on the most recent progress in EWR research? 
Our research questions are based on the following assumptions and preliminary conclusions: 
1. The predictive capacities of conflict-EWR mechanisms have greatly improved over 
the last two decades. However, they still suffer from the fact that the underlying theory 
(or at least hypothesis) about causal chains towards violence and the role of small 
events are not always spelled out;  
2. The link between warning and response remains weak. Response is often lacking, 
despite clear warning signals. But do decision makers receive the required 
information? Early warning often seems alarmist and sometimes offensive to 
governments. Not least, cognitive biases on the side of analysts and decision makers 
may hinder an appropriate reaction; 
3. Regional organisations often fail to respond in time to prevent violent conflict not 
because of a lack of information on an emerging conflict but due to several barriers or 
weaknesses, namely the political differences and lack of common values within 
organisations, the hesitation to overrule the principle of non-interference in internal 
matters of the state, the lack of capacity to intervene, and the unclear and competitive 
mission and geographic reach of regional organisations; 
4. Global and regional initiatives tend to inform policy makers at the top-level. Less 
attention is given to the strength and coping capacities at the local level; inappropriate 
inclusion of the local level leads to neglect of the dynamics of violence at the local-
national-transborder interface and fails to strengthen local coping mechanisms against 
the outbreak of violence. 
This report first takes stock of early warning research. It compares and categorises the most 
advanced early warning systems in their achievements and shortcomings and assesses what 
they have to offer to policy makers. In the following section, we will undertake a comparative 
case study of five regional/sub-regional organisations. Several regional and sub-regional 
organisations have established, or are building up, EWR mechanisms. In Africa, we will focus 
on the Continental Early Warning System (CEWS), an intelligence-gathering and analysis 
centre of the African Union; the Conflict Early Warning Response Mechanism (CEWARN) 
of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development in Eastern Africa (IGAD); and the West 
Africa Early Warning Network (WARN) of the Economic Community of West African States 
(ECOWAS). As contrasting examples, we will analyse and discuss why such EWR 
mechanisms have not been established in Asia and Oceania by the Association of South-East 
Asian Nations (ASEAN) and its Regional Forum, and the Pacific Island Forum (PIF); and 
how far this had impacted on the organisations’ ability to react to upcoming crises. The final 
section aims at finding answers to the question of whether an EWR mechanism can be 
considered a useful tool and spells out policy implications for how regional organisations 
could capitalise on this.  
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Early Warning and Response Mechanisms: How do they work? 
‘Early warning systems’ for the prevention of violent conflict are ‘latecomers’ compared with 
their application in other fields (Bächler et al. 1998: 34). The origin of such systems dates 
back to the 1950s and lies in intelligence and military reconnaissance. In a second phase, 
early warning systems were established in the fields of natural disasters, humanitarian 
emergencies, gross human rights violations, the spread of diseases and economic crises. Since 
the 1980s, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees has undertaken efforts to foresee 
political-humanitarian crises. Within the UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs and the 
Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, several early warning projects led to the 
establishment of a ‘Humanitarian Early Warning System’ in the context of which ReliefWeb 
and the Integrated Regional Information Network were set up. ‘Early response mechanisms’ 
are much more recent efforts to close the gap between early warning and early action and 
have so far been elaborated most convincingly with regard to humanitarian emergencies.  
Conceptualising Early Warning and Response  
In the Berghof Handbook on Conflict Transformation, Alexander Austin (2004) defined an 
early warning system from an academic perspective as: 
‘any initiative that focuses on systematic data collection, analysis and/or 
formulation of recommendations, including risk assessment and information 
sharing, regardless of topic, whether they are quantitative, qualitative or a blend of 
both.’ (Austin 2004: 2) 
Within early warning, three components can be differentiated:  
‘(1) estimating the magnitude and timing of relative risks of emerging threats, (2) 
analyzing the nature of these threats and describing plausible scenarios, and (3) 
communicating warning analyses to decision makers.’ (Woocher 2008: 3) 
Early response, accordingly, means: 
‘any initiative that occurs in the latent stages of a perceived potential armed 
conflict with the aim at reduction, resolution or transformation. The term 
mechanism will refer to the individual units of an E[arly] W[arning] S[ystem] 
such as data collection, data formatting, data analysis with the understanding that 
there is a relationship and process between these unities for the system to operate.’ 
(Austin 2004: 23) 
A crucial, yet so far mainly under-reflected, issue is the question of who is going to be warned 
and who is supposed to act upon this warning. A well-established definition (Dorn 2004: 317) 
sees early warning as ‘the act of alerting a recognized authority (such as the UN Security 
Council) to a new (or renewed) threat to peace at a sufficiently early stage’ (Campbell and 
Meier 2007). But is the ideal of primarily addressing a ‘recognised authority’ a meaningful 
and sufficient criterion? As Casey Barrs (2006) rightly states, we ‘typically ‘wire’ that 
warning toward ourselves so we can take action. But we have given much less thought to also 
warning those who are about to be attacked.’ Thus, the underlying assumptions of most early 
warning systems is that international actors will take over responsibility as protectors as soon 
as adequate information is being processed along with rules and procedures for initiating 
appropriate action at the level of an international or regional organisation (Barrs 2006: 1, 
relying on Adelman 1999 and Darcy 2005). These assumptions, however, have so far not 
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been confirmed in practice. Accordingly, Barrs has proposed ‘to focus more effort on a 
warning capacity within the killing grounds’ (Barrs 2006: 4). Such an approach could 
facilitate the reduction or even overcoming of the gap between early warning and early 
response. 
Efficient EWR systems can tackle various threats to human security, such as: a) wars and 
armed conflict; b) state failure; c) genocide and politicide; d) other gross human rights 
violations; and e) humanitarian emergencies caused by natural disasters. In the following we 
primarily focus on the related threats to the categories a) to c) for which we use, mainly in 
accordance with the Political Instability Task Force (PITF), the umbrella term ‘political 
instability’.2 These are also the types of conflict in which a prevention role is expected from 
regional organisations. Relying on the definitions used by the Human Security Center (2005; 
2006), we can define ‘wars’ as forms of collective violence in which one of the parties 
involved is a government and which result in more than 1,000 battle-related deaths per year. 
Armed conflicts include collective violence beyond the threshold of 1,000 battle-related 
deaths as well as ‘non-state’ forms of political violence between warlords, militias, guerrillas, 
and other organised groups. ‘State failure’ means that a state can hardly perform its core 
functions, such as maintaining a legitimate monopoly of force, guaranteeing the rule of law, 
opening channels for political participation, securing basic needs and implementing political 
decisions through administrative acts. Genocides and politicides, as defined by Barbara Harff,  
‘are the promotion, execution, and/or implied consent of sustained policies by 
governing elites or their agents--or, in the case of civil war, either of the 
contending authorities--that are intended to destroy, in whole or part, a communal, 
political, or politicized ethnic group. In genocides the victimized groups are 
defined by their perpetrators primarily in terms of their communal characteristics. 
In politicides, in contrast, groups are defined primarily in terms of their political 
opposition to the regime and dominant groups.’ (Harff 2003: 58) 
EWR mechanisms in this sense are a part of an overall crisis-prevention architecture, but this 
is not the same as conflict or crisis prevention. Howard Adelman (2008) argued:  
‘E[arly] W[arning] is intended to detect rising tensions headed towards violent 
conflict and, therefore, is complementary to conflict prevention when it focuses 
on tensions that are already rising but has little to do with preventing tensions 
from rising at all. (...) E[arly] W[arning] does include not only the gathering of 
data but the analysis of that data to develop strategic options for response but does 
not include the responses themselves which come under conflict prevention.’  
In the more recent literature other classifications are used, differentiating between: 
• operational prevention – short-term efforts using political or military means to prevent 
a conflict or forestall escalating violence; 
• structural prevention – efforts through developmental or economic tools to address the 
root causes of conflict, aiming at risk reduction and to call for better regulatory 
frameworks; 
                                                 
2 Leiden University’s Interdisciplinary Research Programme on Root Causes of Human Rights Violations 
(PIOOM) tried to build up a mapping of Gross Human Rights Violations (GHRV) with the potential for an early 
warning system in the 1990s, but this project has not been continued. New data related to GHRV are being 
provided by the Human Security Report, but do not claim to have predictive qualities. 
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• systemic prevention – tries to reduce conflict on a global basis and goes beyond 
mechanisms focused on any particular state (Rubin and Jones 2007). 
Structural and systemic prevention both target underlying causes of conflict with a mid- to 
long-term perspective. However, they could be inadequate in an upcoming or even acute 
crisis that requires early action. Thus, we will primarily concentrate on response mechanisms 
within the category of operational prevention, ‘which seeks to contain or reverse the 
escalation of violent conflict by using the tools of preventive diplomacy, economic sanctions 
and/or incentives, and/or military force’ (Campbell and Meier 2007). 
Categorising Early Warning and Response Systems 
Despite growing scepticism in the policy and donor communities, papers and publications on 
early warning research and EWR have experienced an upsurge within the last two years 
(Marshall 2008; Goldstone 2008; Meier 2007; Barton and von Hippel 2008; Nyheim 2008; 
Campbell and Meier 2007; Schmeidl 2008). The review studies use different ways to 
categorise the broad spectrum of EWR models:  
• In ‘Early Warning: A Review of Conflict Prediction Models and Systems’, Barton and 
von Hippel (2008) cluster 30 models that try to predict conflict or instability according to 
the sectors from which they stem: a) national government models; b) international and 
regional organisation models; c) academic, NGO and think-tank models; and d) private 
models; 
• David Nyheim (2008) undertook a ‘Mapping of Early Warning and Response Systems’ 
for the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development/Development 
Assistance Committee. In his overview and critical appraisal he differentiated between 
quantitative and qualitative systems, as well as between early warning models and policy 
tools. 
• Verstegen (1999) introduced four ideal type models: a) ‘correlation models’ focus on 
structural indicators and try to relate causal models from empirical research to future 
outbreaks of violence;  b) ‘sequential models’ filter accelerators in order to understand 
when particular events lead to worsening a crisis situation; c) ‘conjunctural models’ look 
at escalation scenarios and inductively establish what factor combinations and thresholds 
lead to violence; and d) ‘response models’ try to identify windows of opportunity for 
early and effective intervention in crisis situations. 
• Finally, Marshall (2008) classifies the 21 early warning models in his review according to 
three types: a) conditional and causal models deal with empirical evidence for causal 
interference between independent variables and violent conflict/political instability. They 
are of crucial importance for predictive models as they help to identify valid indicators 
(Marshall 2008: 9); b) predictive models try to forecast the outbreak of violence in a time 
span of one to five years. They focus on selected variables and in most cases not only 
include structural variables, but also process indicators or event-based information 
(Marshall 2008: 10); and c) general risk and capacity models are used ‘to rank countries 
from weak to strong, building on the general association between weakness, social 
problems, political conflict, and poor state performance’ (Marshall 2008: 10-11). 
We find Marshall’s differentiation most useful since it focuses on the aims of the models that 
make them more comparable. In our own compilation (see Appendix) we thus take up 
Marshall’s categories, albeit with two specifications: 1) in order to keep the vast amount of 
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general risk and assessment models under control we divide them between those which aim at 
rankings or performance ratings and those which aim at targeted intervention (Verstegen’s 
‘response model’); 2) we add in-depth investigative research and intelligence as an important 
additional category – a qualitative component that Marshall neglects, but which is regarded as 
highly valuable by practitioners as well as country and area specialists. In our review we list 
five major causal models: a) five predictive models (mainly run by the PITF); b) a dozen 
institutions that rank and rate states according to their risks and capacities; c) about twenty 
efforts to integrate risk and capacity assessments into early response models; d) several 
private companies, NGOs and government agencies that offer or use investigative case study 
research; and e) intelligence for early warning. 
Selected EWR Models, Tools and Mechanisms 
What are the assumptions underlying the different early warning projects? Which 
methodologies are used? Within these five categories we have singled out one prominent 
example of each in order to illustrate how these models, tools and mechanisms work, namely: 
a) the World Bank’s greed model of rebellion; b) the PITF’s global and sub-Saharan model; 
c) the Fragile States Index (FSI); d) the Country Indicators for Foreign Policy (CIFP) of 
Carleton University; and e) the International Crisis Group’s (ICG) Crisis Watch – probably 
the most reputed and frequent alert system based on qualitative investigative research and 
‘NGO intelligence’. 
Table 1: Early warning and response with regard to violent conflict and state fragility – 
selected models, tools and mechanisms 
Source: Barton and von Hippel 2008; Marshall 2008; Nyheim 2008; own research and compilation. See full 
table in Appendix. 
Institution / Lead Researchers 
Classification  
a. Name of the Model 
b. URL Link 
c. Major publications (e.g. Fearon/Laitin 2003) 
A. Conditional and Causal Factor Models (with predictive qualities/implications) 
(1) World Bank Development Research Group 
and Oxford University / Paul Collier and Anke 
Hoeffler 
ACAD, IGO 
a. Greed model of rebellion (opportunity structures) 
b. http://econ.worldbank.org/programs/conflict  
c. Collier/Hoeffler 1998; Collier/Hoeffler 2004a; 
Collier/Hoeffler 2004b 
B. Predictive Models 
(2) Political Instability Task Force, Center for 
Global Policy / Monty G. Marshall 
ACAD 
a. PITF global model 
PITF African Instability model 
b. http://globalpolicy.gmu.edu/pitf/pitfp5.htm 
c. Goldstone et al. 2005 
C. Risk and Capacity Assessments (Rankings and Performance Ratings) 
(3) The Fund for Peace and Foreign Policy  
ACAD, NGO 
a. Failed States Index, based on the Conflict 
Assessment System Tool (CAST) 
b. http://www.fundforpeace.org/web/index.php?option=
com_content&task=view&id=99&Itemid=140  
c. Fund for Peace 2008  
D. Risk and Capacity Assessments with Early Response Component (event analysis)  
(4) Carleton University, Canadian Government / 
Gerald Cosette 
ACAD, GOV 
a. Country Indicators for Foreign Policy (CIFP)  
b. http://www.carleton.ca/cifp/ 
c. Country Indicators for Foreign Policy 2008  
E. Crisis Watch Lists based on Investigative Case Study Research or Intelligence  
(5) International Crisis Group, Belgium 
PRIV 
a. Crisis Watch 
b. http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=1200
&l=1 
 
ACAD = academic; GOV = governmental; IGO = international governmental organisation; INGO = 
international non-governmental organisation; NGO = non-governmental organisation; PRIV = private 
organisation 
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1. Causal Models: The greed model of rebellion 
Different causal models are currently competing in explaining ethnic rebellion, civil war and 
state failure. Among the most prominent are Ted Robert Gurr’s Minorities Risk Project 
(Adelmann 1998), the findings by the PITF (Esty et al. 1998; Goldstone et al. 2000), the 
Horizontal Inequalities Model (Fearon and Laitin 2003) and Collier and Hoeffler’s (2001) 
greed/opportunity structure model. All of these models have substantially informed the choice 
of valid indicators for risk and capacity assessments and sometimes also the focus of attention 
within investigative research and intelligence. EWR systems that do not take the findings of 
advanced causal models into account have increasingly become difficult to maintain and 
justify.  However, the problem remains that the findings of causal models are contested.   
Collier and Hoeffler’s greed model of rebellion – a model which has been soundly criticised 
(Marchal 2004; Nathan 2005; Suhrke et al. 2005) – may help to illustrate this argument. This 
model takes up the robust finding that civil war is strongly correlated with a low GDP per 
capita (Collier and Hoeffler 2002: 15-16). At the same time, the model argues that ‘grievance’ 
is not a decisive factor for the outbreak of violence, but it is the opportunity of organising a 
military rebellion that matters. A low per-capita income, in this interpretation, may also mean 
that a state is not capable of maintaining effective control over its territory (Fearon and Laitin 
2003: 81). Furthermore, the absence of viable economic alternatives and the absence of 
formal education make it easy to recruit young men (Collier and Hoeffler 2001: 16). Possible 
sources of rebel income are external assistance, plundering of natural resources like 
diamonds, coltan or copper and the control of raw material exports (Azam 2002: 12). As Mats 
Berdal and David Malone (2000: 5) have pointed out, within this economic model the 
‘traditional objective of war – to defeat the enemy military – is replaced by economically 
driven interests in continued fighting and the institutionalism of violence at what is clearly a 
profitable level of intensity’. As a consequence, the availability of resources as a means of 
‘fuelling war’ (Le Billon 2005), measured by the extent of primary commodity exports 
(Collier and Hoeffler 2001: 26), became a major concern for crisis prevention – and also for 
early warning. Collier and Hoeffler (2002: 19) stressed the predictive implications of their 
model repeatedly; in particular, they argued that where primary commodity exports make up 
more than 30 percent of the GDP, a country is three times more violence-prone compared to a 
situation where primary commodity exports make up less than 10 percent of the GDP.  
2. Predictive Models of the Political Instability Taskforce 
The most advanced predictive models have been developed by the PITF (formerly known as 
the State Failure Task Force). They are based on the empirical findings of a data set that tries 
to explain events of political instability from 1955 onwards (Esty et al. 1998). Goldstone et al. 
(2005) claim that because of data availability and methodological richness their approach is 
superior to those put forward by Bates et al. (2003), Collier and Hoeffler (1998, 2001, 2002), 
Elbadawi and Sambanis (2000), Fearon and Laitin (2003) and Regan and Norton (2005). 
Though the self-assertiveness displayed by the PITF seems to be exaggerated, apparently it is 
the only project that tries to translate causal into predictive models. A major disclaimer, 
however, is that the conceptual and factual basis of the evaluation of their forecasting models 
is not fully disclosed and thus not reproducible for external observers – although most of the 
project’s data are available on the internet. 
PITF uses applied logistic regression, neural network analysis, Makov processes and event-
history models in order to explain the occurrence of political instability episodes since 1955. 
Because of the high number of countries and years (more than 7,500 country-years), these 
episodes (about 150) make up only about 2 percent of the universe – a reason why the PITF to 
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a large extent has relied on the ‘case-control method’. This tool stems from medical research, 
where it is used, for example, to single out specific risk factors for cancer patients in 
comparison to control groups with similar background conditions, but with a non-occurrence 
of the disease (conditional logitistic regression analysis). The PITF profiled cases of 
instability within a short-term time horizon, ‘using data drawn from two years prior to the 
onset of instability’ (Goldstone et al. 2005). 
To its own surprise, the PITF team found that ‘relatively simple models, involving just a 
handful of variables and no complex interactions, accurately classify 80% or more of the 
instability onsets and stable countries in the historical data’ (Goldstone et al. 2005): 
‘The model essentially has only four independent variables: regime type, infant 
mortality …, a ‘bad neighborhood’ indicator flagging cases with four or more 
bordering states embroiled in armed civil or ethnic conflict, and the presence or 
absence of state-led discrimination.’  
Using executive recruitment and the competitiveness of political participation for determining 
the regime type, the PITF found out that hybrid regimes were substantially more prone to 
violence than full autocracies or full democracies. Among hybrid regimes, partial democracies 
where political competition was shaped by particularistic ethnic, religious or regional agendas 
(factionalism) were particularly vulnerable (Goldstone et al. 2005).  
Most of the causal factors identified in the global model were also applicable to regional 
contexts. In the model for sub-Saharan Africa, for example, the regime type continued to be 
the most important variable – with all partial democracies with factionalist political 
competition experiencing instability. At the same time, this regional model also showed some 
particularities: infant mortality no longer had a decisive impact, as the differences within the 
region were not significant. At the same time, the relevance of state-led discrimination 
increased. Furthermore, some variables achieved significant relevance, such as trade 
openness, colonial heritage, leader’s years in office and the existence of a dominant religious 
majority (Goldstone et al. 2005).   
It is obvious that the PITF model brings politics back in with regard to early warning models, 
putting regime type, state-led discrimination, factionalism and leader’s years in office on the 
agenda. It is quite telling that these variables do not play a major role in most of the risk and 
capacity assessments used by international governmental and regional organisations, since 
they touch on sensitive issues of sovereignty and could have far-reaching political 
implications for ‘early response’.  
3. Risk and Capacity Assessments (Ranking and Performance): the Failed States Index  
One of the most influential performance ratings was first published in 2005 by the Foreign 
Policy Magazine and the US ‘Fund for Peace’: the so-called ‘Failed States Index’ (FSI). This 
index ranks 177 countries world-wide according to their level of fragility. The FSI uses 
twelve indicators, which focus on changes that might lead to an escalation of the situation:  
• Social indicators: mounting demographic pressures; massive movement of refugees or 
internally displaced persons creating complex humanitarians emergencies; legacy of 
vengeance-seeking group grievance or group paranoia; chronic and sustained human 
flight; 
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• Economic indicators: uneven economic development along group lines; sharp and/or 
severe economic decline; 
• Political indicators: criminalisation and/or de-legitimisation of the state; progressive 
deterioration of public services; suspension of arbitrary application of the rule of law and 
widespread violation of human rights; security apparatus operates as a ‘state within state’; 
rise of factionalised elites; intervention of other states or external political actors. 
In contrast to other projects, the FSI is not based on existing data sets but created out of an 
evaluation of media reports from more than 150 domestic and international sources. Monthly 
developments are then rated on a scale from 0 to 10 (Baker 2006: 20). The cumulative value 
leads to the ranking – with 120 points indicating extremely bad performance and 90 points 
being the threshold for the ‘alert list’. The FSI does not claim to forecast state failure or 
violent conflict, but wants to assess a state’s vulnerability.  
In the meantime, a number of similar ratings have been developed, such as the Peace and 
Conflict Ledger (Hewitt, Wilkenfeld and Gurr 2008), the State Fragility Index (Marshall and 
Cole 2008), the Index of State Weakness in the Developing World (Rice and Patrick 2008), or 
the Global Peace Index (Institute for Economics and Peace 2008). Marshall (2008) 
optimistically argues that the overall assessments of the different projects match or mostly 
match for 80 percent of the countries, leaving serious differences only for 20 percent. At the 
same time, 20 percent is quite a substantial number if one assumes that it is fairly easy to 
identify through common sense those countries that are regarded as very stable or very 
unstable. It would thus be helpful if the different projects spelled out more clearly the 
conditions, time horizons and criteria under which their validity could be put to the test. 
4. Risk and Capacity Assessments with Early Response Component: Carleton 
University’s Country Indicators for Foreign Policy (CIFP) 
Some prominent risk and capacity assessments with early response component have been 
jointly developed by research institutions and government agencies. Among them are the 
Stability Assessment Framework (Verstegen, Van de Goor and de Zeeuw 2005), which was 
developed by the Clingendael Institute for Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the 
Spelten Model for Early Warning Indicators, used by the German Federal Ministry for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) and developed and improved in 
collaboration with the German Institute of Global and Area Studies, Hamburg (GIGA) and the 
Institute for Development and Peace, Duisburg (INEF).  
The two most advanced projects have been FAST (Early Recognition and Analysis of 
Tensions) (SwissPeace 2006), developed in 1998 by SwissPeace (with Virtual Research 
Associates and VRA Knowledge Manager) for the Swiss Development Agency (DEZA), in 
collaboration with the Swiss government and other donors (Krummenacher et al. 2002: 5), 
and the Country Indicators for Foreign Policy Project (CIFP), which has its home base at the 
Norman Patterson School for International Affairs of Carleton University and serves to 
inform the Canadian government. FAST used quantitative event-data analysis, developed in 
collaboration with Virtual Research Associates, and the FAST tension barometer, as well as 
more qualitative analysis provided by fact-finding missions, local information networks and 
an international expert network. At the same time, it never managed to effectively integrate 
the data pool with thematic reports (Schmeidl 2008) and had to close down in 2008. 
We thus focus on CIFP as currently being the most comprehensive policy-oriented project 
that assesses the capacities for good governance and democratic processes and the risk of 
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violent conflict and fragile statehood (CIFP 2007: 1).3 It is based on a broad range of 
structural indicators that are clustered within six categories (rule of law, human rights, 
government transparency and accountability, government and market efficiency, democratic 
participation, political stability and violence). The focus of the project is on governance and 
democratic processes, complemented by indicators in the socio-economic and security 
dimension. Questions of identity/ethnicity as well as external factors, however, are mostly 
neglected. According to the project’s assumption, violent conflict and state failure are most 
probable if a weak state apparatus is controlled by a repressive regime.  
The structural data are evaluated with an ‘index methodology’ that attributes a weighting 
factor to each indicator and allows for a separate analysis of cluster indices. Within a nine-
point-system for governance and democratic processes (nine meaning very poor 
performance), thresholds indicate the risk level of a state. Besides structural data, the CIFP 
also monitors and analyses events that could worsen the situation. Using the ‘events 
monitoring methodology’, each event is assessed in its intensity and its correlation with 
violent conflict and thus coded as impacting positively or negatively on the stability of its 
respective cluster of indicators: ‘The purpose of CIFP event monitoring is to observe and 
report on events within a country to better understand the dynamic trends affecting 
democratic processes and governance in the country’. The final ‘event analysis’ is based on 
regression lines and tries to capture changes in the intensity and character of events. On this 
basis, the generation of negative, positive and most likely scenarios is feasible (CIFP 2008: 
35-36).  
These types of EWR models have clearly influenced the design of the Conflict Early Warning 
and Response Mechanism (CEWARN) of IGAD, the regional organisation in the Horn of 
Africa. A number of similar social, political and economic indicators (with a particular 
reference and relevance to conflicts in that region) as well as reports on events are used by 
IGAD to anticipate violent conflicts and respond in a timely and effective manner (see below 
and Appendix). 
5. Investigative Research and Intelligence: the Crisis Watch List of the International 
Crisis Group (ICG) 
Research on EWR mechanisms has so far not systematically evaluated the contribution made 
by investigative case-study research and intelligence. This is partly due to the fact that most of 
the intelligence reports provided by commercial or governmental agencies are not accessible 
to the public or are geared to business risks rather than to human security threats. At the same 
time, it may also be due to the fact that early warning analysis and intelligence have 
frequently been viewed as separate fields (Schmeidl 2002, Boshoff 2003). Instead, we follow 
Kristan J. Wheaton and Michael T. Beerbower (2006) who define intelligence as ‘a process, 
focused externally and using information from all available sources, that is designed to reduce 
the level of uncertainty for a decision maker.’ Intelligence can thus be used or misused for 
narrow self-interest, but may also serve the ‘public good’ of early warning. Besides 
intelligence by governmental agencies like the National Intelligence Council, there is a broad 
spectrum of commercial providers, such as Business Environment Risk Intelligence s.a., 
Control Risks Group, the Economist Intelligence Unit (which helped to establish the Global 
                                                 
3 Other risk and capacity assessments have been developed by a variety of research institutions, NGO networks, 
governmental and inter-governmental agencies, among them DFID, the European Commission, the Forum on 
Early Warning and Early Response (FEWER, closed down), UNDP, USAID and regional organisations such as 
the African Union, CEEAC, ECOWAS and IGAD. 
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Peace Index), IHS Energy Group, International Risk Approach, PRS Group or 
STRATFOR.com. 
In the field of EWR, the ICG, basing its work on investigative field research that is close to 
intelligence can be regarded as a success story. This international NGO, located at the 
interface of non-governmental actors and high-ranking decision makers, was established in 
1995 by Mark Malloch Brown, then Vice-President of the World Bank, former US diplomat 
Morton Abramowitz and the late Fred Cuny. Crisis Watch works with reports, briefings, the 
Crisis Watch bulletin and ‘crisis alerts’. Its target audience is policy makers, researchers and 
practitioners and its website is widely used by them. Since the focus is on peace negotiations, 
most of the information is accompanied by policy recommendations or scenario building 
(Schmeidl 2008: 7-8, table). 
Funded mainly by governments and foundations, ICG meanwhile has 130 full-time staff 
members, from 49 nationalities with 52 languages. According to its website, ICG publishes 
around 90 reports and briefings annually on 65 conflict and potential conflict situations, plus 
Crisis Watch, which is a twelve-page monthly bulletin designed to provide busy readers in the 
policy community, media, business and interested general public with a succinct regular 
update on the state of play in all the most significant situations of conflict or potential conflict 
around the world (ICG 2009). The ICG website features a powerful, open-source Crisis 
Watch database, which makes crisis-related event analysis easily accessible. As Schmeidl 
(2008) convincingly argues, the involvement of high-ranking personalities (such as the 
current president Gareth Evans), the provision of otherwise unobtainable information from 
field research and the translation of results into recommendations and even lobbying 
strategies may be a reason why the ICG ‘survived’ the first ten years of its existence while 
FEWER and FAST – two other initiatives from the 1990s – did not. 
In conclusion, the 1990s saw a ‘boom’ in conflict-assessment tools; and in the last few years 
state-failure rankings have blossomed. These instruments and ratings have helped to create 
awareness in the academia, the public and among decision makers. At the same time, it has 
been difficult to systematically link empirical research on the causes of war to conflict 
assessment tools and early warning models.  
Regional Organisations 
The Enhanced Role of Regional Organisations 
Regional organisations have acquired new relevance during the past two decades, particularly 
regarding peace, security, development and the prevention or mitigation of conflict. 
According to the UN Charter, Chapter VIII: 
‘[nothing] precludes the existence of regional arrangements or agencies for 
dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and 
security as are appropriate for regional action provided that such arrangements or 
agencies and their activities are consistent with the Purposes and Principles of the 
United Nations.’ (Article 52.1)  
These regional or sub-regional agencies have been given the task to ‘make every effort to 
achieve pacific settlement of local disputes through such regional arrangements or by such 
regional agencies before referring them to the Security Council’ (Article 52.2). Since the end 
of the Cold War the blockage within the UN has changed, and with the UN system 
increasingly overburdened, the newly discovered ‘new regionalism’ (Hettne 2008) seems to 
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rely more and more on regional and sub-regional organisations. The UN and regional 
arrangements are progressively more engaged in sharing responsibility for peacekeeping, 
especially in situations of state fragility and violence by non-state actors. 
Regional organisations are supposed to have an immediate interest in promoting peace since 
inter-state and intra-state wars normally affect the region through spill-over and 
destabilisation, and groups of states in a certain region ought to have primary security 
concerns that link them together. Experience shows that this logic is not always applied. 
Regional organisations disagree and often quarrel about the best approach to prevent violent 
conflict.  
Reform proposals to improve the conflict prevention effectiveness of the UN and regional 
bodies have been made (UN General Assembly 2001) and a number of regional and sub-
regional organisations, especially in Africa and Europe have engaged in intensified activities 
for the promotion of peace. The potentially vital role of regional organisations in peace 
missions is one of the firm general expectations of such organisations. The experiences in 
Europe have inspired the prospects for a more active and expanded responsibility of regional 
organisations. However, this type of peace and conflict engagement has not taken place in all 
other regions, e.g. regional and sub-regional organisations play a much less pronounced role 
in the Middle East and in Asia. 
The role of regional organisations contains a built-in tension. Regionalisation challenges the 
narrow concepts of national sovereignty since the organisation is meant to take over certain 
state functions – in some cases more, in others less. At the same time, the member states 
anxiously guard their sovereignty and continue to create more and more elaborate regional 
organisations and expand their responsibilities. Clements and Foley (2008: 857) conclude: 
‘To be successful each regional member requires a degree of de-territorialization and de-
borderization and some ceding of hard notions of national sovereignty.’ 
Within the academic discourse critical views on the possible role of regional organisations 
were raised by the so-called realist school. They argue that, in reality, most regional 
organisations have no convincing record to justify the expectation of a conflict-mitigating role 
for regional organisations (Mearsheimer 1994/95). In contrast, mulitlateralists emphasise the 
potential of regional organisations. Given their present structure, regional and sub-regional 
organisations are not in a position to effectively apply the monopoly of force. However, in 
recent years several regional organisations have started to take over responsibilities for the 
promotion of peace. The EU, the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe 
(OSCE) and the AU have all made security interventions in recent years. Early warning 
mechanisms are set up to enable regional organisations to monitor critical developments. The 
interesting question is: do regional or sub-regional organisations depend on established EWR 
mechanisms to effectively act either as peace promoter or conflict preventer? 
At present it would be exaggerating to describe the regional organisations’ peace and security 
functions as an effective regional conflict-management regime. Of course, the security 
dimensions, and thus the task for regional groupings, vary greatly in the different regions and 
security arrangements are not equally relevant for all regions. Theoretically, regional 
organisations can have two different functions for regional peace. Traditionally, neo-
functional theory perceives regional integration as a peace promoter (the EU model). The 
motivation for forming regional bodies is simple: neighbours are better off if they are friendly 
and do not fight wars. Diplomacy, economic and cultural exchange, soft power rather than 
military means are the currency of interactions. The positive result of creating a zone of peace 
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and prosperity or ‘a security community’ (Deutsch et al. 1957) is obvious to all its members. 
The EU-integration process has acted as a stimulus for other regionalist endeavours. 
The second and more recent perspective is the regionalisation of conflict as a reason for 
region building (the ECOWAS model). Regional bodies have an interest to prevent, contain 
or solve violent conflicts in their region because of the disastrous humanitarian and 
development effects and – not the least – because of the spill-over effects into the region. 
These two models are, according to Hettne (2008: 410), different but not contradictory; they 
belong to different stages of conflict. 
The African Union: adoption of interventionist policies 
1. Purpose, mandate and institutions 
Protracted violent conflict and the development crisis in sub-Saharan Africa led to two 
important African economic and security initiatives: the New Partnership for Africa’s 
Development and the transformation of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) into the 
African Union (AU). Both institutions were launched to facilitate ‘African solutions to 
African problems’. The OAU had been the stronghold for upholding state sovereignty. When 
it was launched by the African heads of state in 1999, the AU committed itself to promote 
peace, security and stability of the continent, to promote democracy and good governance, 
due process, the rule of law and human rights, as well to engage in effective intervention 
under grave circumstances. At the same time the vision of the AU upholds defending the 
sovereignty and territorial integrity of its members. 
In its charter, the AU claims far-reaching competencies. Article 4 opened up the possibility of 
military intervention under two circumstances: first, ‘pursuant to a decision of the Assembly 
in respect of grave circumstances, namely: war crimes, genocide and crimes against 
humanity’; and second, upon request of a member state ‘in order to restore peace and 
security’ (African Union 2000).  
On the basis of this charter the AU has engaged in several peace operations and has adopted 
an interventionist policy. It seems that a rudimentary African security architecture to address 
African security needs is emerging. At its top is the AU Peace and Security Council (PSC), 
the political decision-making body, consisting of fifteen rotating members, as an organ ‘for 
the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts’. It is intended to be ‘a collective 
security and early-warning arrangement to facilitate timely and efficient response to conflict 
and crisis situations in Africa’ (African Union 2002). Under the PSC four pillars are being 
formed: 
• An intelligence-gathering and analysis centre (CEWS), which relates to sub-regional 
EWR systems; 
• The Military Staff Committee under whose guidance five brigades of the African Standby 
Force (ASF) are established: ECOBRIG (West Africa); SADCBRIG (Southern Africa); 
EASBRIG (East Africa); North African Brigade and Central African Brigade. The ASF 
consist of military, police and civil capabilities; 
• The Panel of the Wise, an external mediation and advisory body of five members, one 
from each region of the ASF;  
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• The African Peace Facility Fund, a special financial fund jointly financed by the African 
Union and the EU. Within the EU Development Fund the EU has pledged support for the 
African Peace and Security Architecture and will provide €300 million for 2008-2010 
(European Parliament 2008: 9). 
The African Union’s PSC assesses potential crisis situations and sends fact-finding missions 
to trouble spots (Murithi 2008). The PSC has the power to suggest an AU intervention in 
internal crisis situations. Two-thirds of the Assembly of the Heads of State and Government 
of the AU can authorise such an intervention; peace enforcement interventions require a 
mandate of the UN Security Council (Krohn 2008). 
2. Experiences and performance in conflict management 
The AU’s policy of intervention represents a paradigm shift from the OAU’s concept of non-
intervention. However, the AU is still hamstrung in its decision making by a number of 
barriers, not least the political divergences over the criteria of when and where not to 
intervene. A certain tension exists between Article 3 (sovereignty and territorial integrity of 
member states) and Article 4 (intervention under grave circumstances) of the Charter. The 
decision not to intervene is not primarily a question of the availability of information on 
potential or on urgent violent conflicts – the major purpose of EWR systems – but of 
disagreement about the application of these two articles of the Charter.  
In addition, the AU’s military capacities are still not very strong. The ASF is still in its early 
stages. The AU wants to have up to five regional brigades with a strength of at least 3,000 
troops each, ready to operate as an African Rapid Reaction Force by June 2010 and capable of 
deployment anywhere on the continent. This will maintain a working relationship with the 
UN and other international organisations, notably ECOWAS, IGAD, the Southern African 
Development Community (SADC), the Economic Community of Central African States and 
the Arab Maghreb Union. Most advanced is the planning of EASBRIG in East Africa and 
ECOBRIG in West Africa, without, however, the implementation of the planned civil 
component. 
The Continental Early Warning System (CEWS) is supposed to anticipate and thus prevent 
conflict from turning violent. Only a few specialists have been employed so far. Thus, the 
early warning system is far from functioning. The African Peace Facility Fund, mutually 
financed by the EU and AU, provides special support with its pledge of €300 million between 
2008 and 2010 (Kinzel 2007). 
A major influence on the AU has been the operations of the Economic Community of West 
African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) in West African conflict situations. ECOMOG 
was the first African regional initiative on peacekeeping and was deployed in Liberia, Sierra 
Leone and Guinea Bissau. ECOMOG is seen as a model since, according to a study by the 
European Parliament (2008: 16):  
‘[it] shows that a committed and robust regional force can bring an end to 
complicated conflicts. Indeed, the experience of ECOWAS in the field of peace 
and security offers much that the rest of Africa can learn from.’  
During the few years that the AU has been operational it was, or is, engaged in four military 
peacekeeping or peace-building missions (Krohn 2008; Murithi 2008): 
 15  
1. Burundi: The first practical test for the AU was the African Union Mission in Burundi 
(AMIB). The AU intervened in 2003 with more than 3,000 troops from South Africa, 
Ethiopia and Mozambique, primarily to monitor the peace process and to provide security. 
AMIB successfully pacified a potentially fragile situation so that the UN could take over 
in 2004. 
2. Darfur: The second operation in Darfur between 2004 and 2006 proved to be complicated. 
The weak mandate to monitor the humanitarian crisis and to guarantee an armistice, the 
obstinacy of the Sudanese government and the limited financial capacity of the AU show 
the limitations of the AU to intervene in complex crises situations. This task in this vast 
territory was beyond the capacity of the 7,000 AU peacekeeping troops. In 2008 the UN 
Security Council passed a resolution for a combined AU/UN operation to replace the AU 
forces with 20,000 UN peacekeepers. 
3. Somalia: After the Ethiopian, US-backed intervention into Somali, the UN mandated an 
‘IGAD and Member States of the African Union’ (IGASOM), which was never deployed. 
Instead, the AU authorised the African Union Mission in Somalia at the beginning of 
2007 to stabilise the situation, to further dialogue and reconciliation, to facilitate 
humanitarian assistance as well as reconstruction and development. However, in mid 
2008, only 1,400 Ugandan soldiers of the 8,000 planned troops were deployed in Somalia. 
Other pledges have not been implemented in part due to a lack of funds. 
4. Comoros: The most recent operation began in March 2008 to protect the government after 
a military coup. 1,500 AU troops from Libya, Senegal, Sudan and Tanzania are deployed. 
The first three operations made clear that the African Union has some potential for 
peacekeeping, but it is presently not able to carry out multidimensional stabilisation 
operations. It is too early to pass a definitive judgment on the AU’s peacekeeping potential 
but it is obvious that it has its limitations. The AU initiatives have led to a run of donors to 
facilitate the funding of an African Peace and Security Architecture (Engel 2008: 5). 
3. The use of EWR mechanism  
The AU Continental Early Warning System (CEWS), initiated in 2002, is intended – 
according to the Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of 
the African Union – for ‘early responses to contain crisis situations so as to prevent them from 
developing into full-blown conflicts’ (African Union 2002). It consists of two components: 
(1) an observation and monitoring centre (‘The Situation Room’) at the AU headquarters 
which is responsible for data collection and analysis on the basis of appropriate early warning 
indicators; and (2) parallel observation and monitoring units at the sub-regional level, which 
are supposed to link up to the Situation Room. CEWS is an adaptation of the EU early 
warning system. The main instruments of the CEWS are reports, compiled on the basis of 
open source information that identifies potentially dangerous activity. These reports are the 
basis for the Peace and Security Council decisions, particularly for the possible deployment of 
the African Standby Forces. This setup of AU’s early warning system places it into the type 
of risk assessment models with an early warning component (type D, see Table 1). 
The CEWS is planned to deliver standardised and timely early warning reports as well as 
effective policy options as of 2009. An evaluation of the CEWS in 2006 (published in 2008) 
made clear how much is still to be done, particularly also to link up to the emerging regional 
EWR systems (African Union 2008). According to a study of the European Parliament (2008: 
18) the CEWS is understaffed and underfunded and thus seriously constrained in its activity. 
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Considering that the sub-regional EWR mechanisms are still at their infant stage, the current 
early warning capacity of the AU is not very potent.  
ECOWAS/ECOMOG: the model for others? 
1. Purpose, mandate and institutions 
The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) was founded in 1975. It is a 
regional group of fifteen member states, primarily tasked with the promotion of economic 
integration; but conflict management has become increasingly relevant in recent years. In 
1993, a reform of the organisation was passed against the backdrop of an altered international 
environment and regime change in numerous member states. In this process, the goal of 
economic unity was adapted and the support of democracy in the member states became an 
official goal in the new ECOWAS treaty. Chapter II, Article 4, underlines the following 
fundamental principles (ECOWAS 1993): ‘…e) maintenance of regional peace, stability and 
security through the promotion and strengthening of good neighborliness; […]; h) 
accountability, economic and social justice and popular participation in development; […]; j) 
promotion and consolidation of a democratic system of governance in each Member State 
[…]’. ECOWAS also has a Department of Defence and Security in its headquarters. 
ECOWAS states have already ratified protocols regarding non-interference and mutual 
assistance in case of defence in 1976, 1978, and 1981. The 1999 Protocol Relating to the 
Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security 
was tied together with an elaborate conflict-solution mechanism. The organisation created a 
special body for crisis prevention and support of democracy and due process. The Mediation 
and Security Council, made up of nine members, is especially relevant. It has been operating 
since 2001 and was introduced at the urging of the Francophone states, which, against the 
backdrop of Nigeria’s military intervention in Liberia (since 1990) and Sierra Leone (1997), 
wanted to curb the supposed instrumentalisation of ECOWAS by Nigeria as hegemonic 
power. Article 10 of the protocol authorises all forms of intervention; Article 25 permits the 
council to become active when violent conflict emerges, humanitarian threats evolve, the sub-
region is destabilised and serious and massive human rights violations take place as well as in 
situations where a democratically elected government is overthrown or will be overthrown.  
The possibility of intervening in the case of coups against a democratically elected 
government was also underlined in Article 45 of the Protocol on Democracy and Good 
Governance (2001), which already provides for a wide spectrum of incentives, but also 
sanctions in order to facilitate a return to constitutional order. Chapter IV of this Protocol is 
devoted to ‘sub-regional peace and security observation systems’ and ‘early warning 
systems’, leading to the establishment of an Observation and Monitoring Centre (OMC) at the 
ECOWAS Commission (Souaré 2007). ECOMOG) is the core of the newly formed West 
African brigade, intended to be able to deploy 5,000 soldiers and civilians within 90 days as 
well as 1,500 within 30 days (Pabst 2006: 10). 
2. Experiences and performance in conflict management 
Democratic principles have increased in significance over time for ECOWAS. The ambitious 
Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance in 2001 explicitly formulated democratic 
requirements for the member states: division of power with autonomous legislative and 
judicative branches, free elections and participation, civil control of armed forces, freedom of 
press and assembly, protection against discrimination and ‘zero tolerance for power obtained 
or maintained by unconstitutional means’. State fragility and stability mattered insofar as the 
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Protocol discussed both the territorial integrity and political sovereignty of the member states. 
In the event of eroding political authority, ECOWAS promises to support the re-establishment 
of an elected government. Given this aim the type of EWR mechanisms described above 
under the heading of predictive models (e.g. the Political Instability Force as well as the 
Failed State Index) are of relevance for ECOWAS. 
In the Gambia (1994), Niger (1999), and Togo (2005), ECOWAS tried with varying degrees 
of success to mediate after a coup or constitutional crisis. ECOMOG was the first African 
regional initiative on peacekeeping when ECOMOG troops intervened after the crisis and the 
failure of diplomatic negotiations in Liberia in 1990 to establish law and order. Further 
missions in Sierra Leone, Guinea Bissau and again in Liberia have established ECOMOG as a 
serious regional player. Since 2002, ECOWAS has (if only unsuccessfully) been active in 
peacekeeping in the Ivory Coast; this mission later gave way to the UN mission for the Ivory 
Coast. 
Despite its ambitious goals, ECOWAS has only limited operational resources at its disposal. 
Its budget mainly goes towards financing the fixed costs of the Secretary’s office staff. There 
is a meagre ‘regional fund’ that finances projects in member states. However, since June 
2006, ECOWAS has had a rapid response force at its command - the Standby Brigade 
(ECOBRIG) consisting of up to 6,500 soldiers. Compared to other African regional 
organisations ECOWAS has evolved into a front runner for security and political integration. 
Even though the rationale of its interventions oscillates between collective security and 
partisan hegemony, the regional organisation has constituted itself as a capable actor that has 
built up its own sub-regional security regime. 
3. The use of EWR mechanism  
ECOWAS authorised in its Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance the establishment 
of a sub-regional peace and security observation system with the intention of early warning. 
This mechanism also establishes an Observation and Monitoring Centre (OMC) at the 
headquarters as well as four observation and monitoring zones with monitoring units within 
the sub-region (zonal bureaux).  
The West African Network for Peacebuilding (WANEP) has been engaged by ECOWAS to 
assist in data collection for the purpose of early warning. WANEP is a sub-regional civil 
society organisation based in Ghana. Since 2002, when a memorandum of understanding was 
signed, WANEP has been officially charged with facilitating the ECOWAS Warning and 
Response Network (ECOWARN). WANEP collects data on human security issues, most 
notably human rights and democracy, food shortages, unemployment, arms flows and civil-
military relations and droughts and flooding (Souaré 2007). WANEP processes and analyses 
the data and prepares reports for the OMC at the ECOWAS headquarters in Abuja. 
An evaluation of the EWR system carried out in August 2008 concluded ‘that the system is on 
the right course’ (ECOWARN 2008). The ECOWAS system is an innovative approach 
insofar as it combines data collection by civil society and government officials. On this basis 
it belongs to the type of EWR models described above as risk assessment and early warning 
as well as investigative research by civil society (types D and E, see Table 1). At the time of 
writing the WANEP-ECOWAS early warning reports are not publicly available.4 
Nevertheless, a component of the AU CEWS is in an emergent state in the ECOWAS region.  
                                                 
4 WANEP wrote in a communication with the authors on 22 October 2008: ‘We are still finalizing the modalities 
and protocols (since ECOWAS is an inter-governmental organisation with restrictions on what is public and in 
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IGAD: conflict-prone, divided and weak 
1. Purpose, mandate and institutions 
The Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) in Eastern Africa superseded in 
1996 the Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Development, which was founded in 
1986 primarily to react to the recurring and severe droughts and other natural disasters in the 
Horn of Africa. IGAD’s mission was extended to assist member states to achieve food 
security and environmental protection, promote and maintain peace, security and 
humanitarian affairs and facilitate economic cooperation and integration.  
IGAD has no special organ that is responsible for the facilitation of peace and security. It has 
a Secretariat, headed by an Executive Secretary, appointed by the Assembly of the Heads of 
State and Government. IGAD has formulated an extensive strategy for the implementation of 
the various programmes (IGAD 2003). Since the Horn of Africa is a region that is haunted by 
conflicts ranging from intra-state and inter-state to cross-border community conflicts, a 
Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism (CEWARN) was established in 2000. The 
rational of CEWRAN is to systematically anticipate violent conflicts and respond in a timely 
and effective manner. This – it is argued in the mission statement – is more effective and 
would also prove much cheaper both in terms of human and material resources than dealing 
with full-blown crises.  
CEWARN is funded from regular member states’ contributions and supported by 
development donors such as the German Agency for Technical Cooperation (GTZ) and US 
Agency for International Development (USAID). It has initiated the Rapid Response Fund to 
help finance projects targeted at preventing, de-escalating or resolving pastoral and related 
conflicts in the region. The fund is intended to improve the flexibility and build up the 
required capacity to respond to early warning signals and address crises in a timely and 
appropriate manner. With the revitalisation of IGAD in 1996, the presence of the IGAD 
Partner Forum and the Friends of IGAD, a group of partners who work closely with the 
IGAD-Secretariat, steadily increased. 
2. Experiences and performance in conflict management 
IGAD, like several other regional institutions, should take the lead on conflict management, 
but it is severely hampered by wars and conflict among its members. Considering the fact that 
within IGAD we find Somalia as a collapsed state, Sudan with its wars and defying 
international conflict-moderating action, Ethiopia and Eritrea in a state of no-peace-no-war 
and Uganda with its northern conflict with the Lord’s Resistance Army, the impossible 
conflict mediating task of the regional organisation becomes apparent (Rupiya and Nhema 
2008). Obviously, IGAD is compromised by conflicts and has not been in a position to 
develop a framework capable of coping with these conflicts (Healy 2008). Problems are 
exacerbated by the fact that both Kenya and Ethiopia aspire to regional leadership, which, for 
example, led to the decision that the headquarters of the East African Brigade (EASBRIG) 
has been placed in Addis Ababa while the planning element is situated in Nairobi (European 
Parliament, 2008: 22-23). Given the tension between Ethiopia and Eritrea it is not conceivable 
that their troops would presently serve together under an IGAD command. 
The security architecture of IGAD is – with the exception of the EWR system CEWARN – 
not presently at an implementation stage. However, despite all these difficulties IGAD has 
                                                                                                                                                        
house) as to what would be published. By end of first quarter next year (2009), hopefully, the new look website 
with detail publications would be launched.’ 
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established its EWR system, which concentrates on monitoring pastoral conflicts, thus 
avoiding becoming caught up in the major conflicts of the region.  
3. The use of EWR mechanism  
The seven member states of IGAD created CEWARN for the Horn of Africa region. The 
mandate of CEWARN is to ‘receive and share information concerning potentially violent 
conflicts as well as their outbreak and escalation in the IGAD region’ (Von Keyserlingk and 
Kopfmüller 2006: 5). With the mandate to predict tensions and conflicts CEWARN combines 
elements of the predictive model and the risk assessment models (types B and D, see Table 1). 
Because of a number of acute inter- and intra-state conflicts in the region CEWARN initially 
adopted an incremental approach by focusing exclusively on two pastoralist conflicts. Its 
ultimate aim is to report on all violent conflicts in a broadly defined human security area and 
not just on national or state security. Operationally, CEWARN established a network of field 
monitors, country coordinators, national research institutes and conflict-EWR units at the 
national level and began its work in two pilot areas on pastoral conflicts in the cross-border 
areas of Ethiopia, Kenya Uganda and Sudan as well as in the second cross-border areas of 
Kenya, Ethiopia and Somalia CEWARN uses a set of 52 socio-political indicators for two 
types of reports: (1) Violent Incident Reports with indicators on armed clashes, raids, protest 
demonstrations and other crimes; and (2) indicators for reports on the presence and status of 
communal relations, civil society activities, economic activities, governance and media, 
natural disasters, safety and security and social services (see Appendix 1). 
According to IGAD’s own assessment, CEWARN’s achievements include:  
• CEWARN has established itself as a sub-regional mechanism with the most 
developed data-based regional early warning system in Africa; 
• It has developed an effective state-of-the-art field monitoring and data-
analysis tool; 
• It has brought to light hitherto unrecognised extent of violence in the pilot 
pastoralist areas; 
• It has conducted capacity building for conflict prevention, management and 
response in the region through skill training of stakeholders at various levels; 
• It has managed to build confidence and collaboration amongst various 
stakeholders including governments, civil society organisations, and 
comunity-based organisations. 
CEWARN also recognises that there are several continuing operational gaps of 
implementation, including an inadequate information base and the lack of an effective 
response component. The capabilities and funding of CEWARN as well as those of IGAD are 
limited. The clearing house at the headquarters employs a small number of staff. It is intended 
to report on pastoral conflicts in all member states within the present planning period (2007-
2011). IGAD still needs to decide if CEWARN operations will expand to cover other types of 
conflict as well.  
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ASEAN/ARF: Non-Interference 
1. Purpose, mandate and institutions 
ASEAN was founded in 1967 primarily as an organisation to promote the economic growth of 
its South East Asian members. At the same time it was intended to balance the excessive 
influence of great powers – first the USA and in later years also China. At the same time, 
ASEAN members agreed to a number of declarations and treaties addressing security issues, 
such as the ASEAN Concord, the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (1976), 
the Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality declaration (1971) and the Treaty on the Southeast 
Asia Nuclear Weapons Free Zone (1995). 
ASEAN members and a number of other countries from the region, and from outside the 
region with an interest in Asia and the Pacific, formed the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), a 
multilateral dialogue forum and the only region-wide security forum in the Asia-Pacific 
region. Representatives of 27 states met for the first time in 1994 to foster a dialogue on 
security interests and to make efforts towards establishing confidence-building measures and 
preventive diplomacy. The mandate of the ARF has never been to engage in peacekeeping 
operations. 
ASEAN members still uphold the concept of state sovereignty and non-interference. When, 
for example, Thailand and Malaysia suggested at the end of the 1990s to loosen the non-
intervention norm, calling for ‘constructive engagement’ in other countries (e.g. influencing 
the Junta in Burma), other members of ASEAN regarded this as a hazardous move and 
refused to give up that rule. ASEAN is a mix of authoritarian and democratic regimes. 
Therefore, it is no surprise that the governments hold on to the concept of non-interference in 
the domestic affairs of other member states and oppose formal (or legalistic) approaches to 
conflict resolution and stress instead the cultural diversity in the region (Collins 2007: 212). 
Peace and security issues as well as defence cooperation have increasingly been part of the 
debate within ASEAN. The founding members of ASEAN primarily aimed at economic 
cooperation without, however, ignoring the positive effects of cooperation for security. They 
intended to seek regional stability and overcome or avoid inter-member disputes and 
conflicts, like the Indonesian Konfrontasi, the Malaysian-Philippine conflict over Sabah, 
Thailand and Myanmar border skirmishes, bilateral territorial disputes between Singapore and 
Malaysia as well as internal ethnic secessionist aspirations and communist insurgencies 
(Poole 2007; Acharya 2007). 
2. Experiences and performance in conflict management 
Originally ASEAN was not a ‘security-oriented structure’, but it facilitated and protected 
regime security (Narine 2002: 15). Regional identity was not given, but the members hoped to 
pursue a gradual process towards making such an identity possible. The later admission of the 
new members Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam made ASEAN a geographically more 
inclusive organisation. At the same time it increased the divergences of political norms and 
the range of the security issues within the organisation. ASEAN’s concept of regionalism has 
been very flexible and does not necessarily follow a common policy. The marginal influence 
of ASEAN on the governance behaviour of the Junta in Myanmar is but one example of the 
lack of common political values within the organisation.  
Basic concepts such as non-alignment, sovereignty, territorial integrity, non-interference, 
peaceful settlements of disputes are, of course, not the inventions of ASEAN or ARF. They 
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had already been prominent during the Bandung Conference of 1955. As Severino, the former 
Secretary General of ASEAN, pointed out these norms ‘dovetailed with the Five Principles of 
Peaceful Coexistence formulated by China in the 1950s’ (quoted in Stubbs. 2008: 462). 
ASEAN has a mixed record of conflict management. Member states proudly point to their 
consensus on managing the Cambodia conflict in the late 1980s and early 1990s with 
Vietnam’s occupation of that country. In contrast, the Indonesian armed forces’ involvement 
in East Timor after the referendum for independence in 1999 was barely criticised by 
ASEAN. Member states had contrasting views on participating in the INTERFET mission in 
East Timor. Only Thailand and the Philippines joined the Australian-led forces while 
Malaysia and Singapore joined belatedly and very reluctantly. The newer members 
(Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam) refused to get engaged.  
Sridharan (2008: 11) classifies the ASEAN approach as not  
‘a typical conflict-resolution mechanism, but it has evolved as a conflict-
avoidance technique relying on softer elements like regional understanding and 
trust rather than on formalised, rules-based instrumentalities.’ 
The wider forum − ARF with ASEAN as the core plus other states from the region as well as 
outside powers (USA, EU and Canada) − has not made much progress in achieving its two 
primary goals of preventive diplomacy in crises and confidence building. The region has been 
plagued by a number of unresolved territorial disputes (in the South China Sea, Taiwan 
Strait), other inter-state conflicts (North and South Korea) as well as intra-state conflicts, 
including ethnic, religious and separatist (Aceh, Cambodia, East Timor, Mindanao, Tibet 
etcetera), which could endanger the security of the region. In addition, many states in the 
region are investing strongly in the modernisation of their armed forces and in a military 
build-up. 
Within ARF two groupings of countries can be found. A first group, among them China and 
most ASEAN countries, has been worried about the possibility that preventive diplomacy 
might encroach on their sovereignty and lead to intervention in their internal affairs. They fear 
that so-called humanitarian intervention and preventive diplomacy have the potential to 
undermine the principle of non-interference. A second more activist group, among them 
Australia, Canada, the EU, the USA and Japan, stresses the importance of the full 
kaleidoscope of the EWR mechanism and regional-dispute solutions, including fact-finding 
missions, good offices of special representatives and consideration of such security related 
issues as non-proliferation, drug trafficking, terrorism, marine safety etc. (Yuzuwa 2006). 
Over several rounds of ministerial meetings only gradual advancement has been made on 
confidence-building measures (for example the simple fact that the ARF offers a forum to 
discuss the partition of Korea or that the ARF is a venue to submit voluntary background 
briefings on regional security issues). However, the ARF is not given an independent role in 
conflict management. Not even an enhanced role of the rotating ARF chair was acceptable to 
China. The ARF’s operating rules of consensus decision-making and the diplomatic norm of 
maintaining a pace of negotiations and actions comfortable to all participants has led to a lack 
of progress in response to crises and security concerns. In none of the major acute recent 
crises in the region (Aceh, East Timor, Burma, Tibet) did the ARF play an important role. 
The ARF, but also ASEAN, are criticised for their inadequate roles in conflict management. 
However, the judgement of observers varies: ASEAN’s conflict-avoidance technique, de-
escalation strategy and promotion of regional understanding (though not based on formal 
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rules) and its consensus techniques (by agreeing to accept disagreement on contentious issues) 
are recognised and honoured as the specific ‘ASEAN or Asian way’. ASEAN ‘has made 
probably the most successful attempt at regional cooperation in the non-Western world’ 
(Poole 2007: 4). At the same time, ASEAN is criticised for remaining at an infant stage of 
regional security cooperation and as an organisation with a lack of norm compliance due to its 
members’ fear of losing national control over security policy (Jones and Smith 2001). Its 
failure to address the East Timor crisis and to manage the conflict-resolution process has 
damaged the organisation’s reputation. ASEAN is not seen as a ‘security community’ (with 
the ‘we’-feeling of Karl W. Deutsch), but it could become, according to Emmerson (2005: 
170) ‘a pluralistic SC [security community]’. In conclusion, ASEAN and ARF are still far 
away from taking a pro-active role in conflict resolution and can certainly not be expected to 
function in the near- or medium-term future as a regional peacekeeping organisation as is 
being discussed within the UN. 
3. Absence of an EWR mechanism  
ASEAN has always emphasised its informal approach without binding legal obligations in 
dealing with tensions within member states and between members. Upholding the principle of 
non-interference results, of course, in the inability to implement an EWR system since EWR 
reports or data analysis would have to include criticism of conflict situations within and 
between states. As long as non-intervention is the hallmark of ASEAN as well as ARF it 
seems inconceivable that early warning of emerging conflicts of intra-state or intra-regional 
nature will take place. 
Nevertheless, most observers agree that the ‘incremental, consultative and consensus-based 
approach that ASEAN follows has created a more stable regional order’ (Sridharan, 2008: 
22). And ‘[d]espite considerable political and cultural diversity, the Association has provided 
a forum for dialogue between Southeast Asian states, and the opportunity for cooperation’ 
Poole, 2007: 4). Since ASEAN and ARF have stressed the need for good governance there is 
a tension between the principle of non-interference and the emerging norms of governance. It 
remains to be seen how the regional organisations in Asia will be able to maintain these two 
partly contradictory norms with their consensus-oriented policies in the future.  
In 2003, ASEAN published its Second Declaration of ASEAN Concord with its long-term 
intention to create an ASEAN Community by 2015 based on three pillars: 
‘namely political and security cooperation, economic cooperation, and socio-
cultural cooperation that are closely intertwined and mutually reinforcing for the 
purpose of ensuring durable peace, stability and shared prosperity in the region.’ 
(ASEAN 2003) 
The concept of a ‘community’ implies the notion of moving towards a more formal 
organisation even in the field of peace and security. 
PIF: nascent security framework and rudimentary structures 
1. Purpose, mandate and institutions 
The Pacific Islands Forum (PIF), formerly the South Pacific Forum, was founded in August 
1971. It comprises 16 independent and self-governing states in the Pacific. The Forum is the 
region’s premier political and economic policy organisation. In its vision, it is stated that the 
Pacific region ‘can, should and will be a region of peace, harmony, security and economic 
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prosperity, so that all its people can lead free and worthwhile lives’ (Australian Government 
2004). Besides programmes on economic growth, sustainable development and good 
governance the PIF has in recent years initiated its programme on security. In 2004 the 
leaders of the PIF established a security programme (for peace and security and a Pacific anti-
money laundering project). This concept is mainly concerned with domestic security issues 
and transnational crime. 
The political and security programme promotes forum interests and positions in the 
international arena and provides policy advice and technical assistance to members on 
international relations, law-enforcement cooperation, political, legal and security issues. The 
main focuses of the programme include:  
• Legal sector cooperation and the implementation of the legislative priorities;  
• Monitoring of regional political developments in member countries;  
• Building capacity in conflict prevention and response; 
• Conducting election observer missions to Forum Island Countries; 
• Building the capacity of law-enforcement agencies to combat transnational crime. 
The PIF leaders signed a security declaration in 2000 (Biketawa Declaration). It is a nascent 
security framework with commitments to upholding democratic processes and good 
governance and addressing crises in the region. The declaration includes a mechanism to 
advise and consult with the Forum’s foreign ministers to undertake one, or a combination of, 
the following actions to assist in the resolution of crisis: 
• A statement representing the view of members on the situation; 
• The creation of a Ministerial Action Group; 
• A fact-finding or similar mission; 
• Convening an eminent persons group; 
• Third party mediation; 
• Support for appropriate institutions or mechanisms that would assist a resolution;  
• The convening of a special high level meeting of the Forum Regional Security Committee 
or an ad hoc meeting of Forum Ministers. 
In the Biketawa Declaration, forum leaders emphasised the principle of non-interference in 
domestic affairs of another member state. The PIF has not established any specific organ or 
council for peace; instead it is a dialogue forum on such issues. 
2. Experiences and performance in conflict management 
The Biketawa Declaration has been invoked twice since its promulgation in 2000, with the 
Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands and the Pacific Regional Assistance for 
Nauru. Three successful election observer missions in the region – Bougainville, Solomon 
Islands and Fiji – have also been undertaken under this framework.  
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3. The use of EWR mechanism  
The PIF is nowhere near as large or as elaborate as other regional organisations such as the 
EU, the African Union and ASEAN, or even as sub-regional organisations as ECOWAS or 
SADC. But its aims and mandate are similar and facilitation of security is on the agenda of 
the PIF. The PIF is concerned with the broader issues of security and wants to develop ‘a 
human security framework’ (PIF 2008a). This is intended to provide a set of tools for 
preventing crises and conflicts. This is primarily a research programme with studies on 
conflict-prevention activities in the member states Vanuatu, Samoa, Kiribati and Micronesia. 
In cooperation with civil society organisations and the United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP), the PIF will address three elements: causes of conflict, monitoring 
conflict escalation and strengthening conflict-resolution mechanisms. At present, the 
information sharing on law enforcement and transnational organised crime is being 
established. This research programme is far from a functioning EWR mechanism but it 
includes elements of the above mentioned causal EWR models (type A) and a strong 
connection to local groups (type E civil society-based models).   
Clements and Foley (2008: 859) conclude that the majority of PIF members have governance 
systems at the national level that are not yet fully developed. These are states with hybrid 
political orders that combine elements of the introduced Western models of governance and 
elements stemming from local indigenous traditions (Boege et al., 2008). These authors stress 
that the maintenance of security and peace building in many island countries depends on the 
contribution of customary governance.  
In the case of the PIF, the regional organisation largely depends on the cooperation of the 
local communities, which often is the real provider of security, and the modern Western-type 
nation-state institutions. Yet given the limited capabilities of PIF, the majority of the 
resources, both financially as well as in terms of military capacities for intervention, come 
from Australia and New Zealand. 
PIF has been discussing the development of a crisis early warning system. The Secretary 
General of the forum expressed his hope that such a system would be strengthened through 
the collaboration with UNDP; he further emphasised that ‘significant progress in developing a 
natural disaster Regional Early Warning Strategy’ has been made (PIF 2008b). Natural 
disasters affect people’s security much more than violent conflicts, although such conflicts are 
not unknown in the region, notably in Papua New Guinea and the Solomon Islands where 
Australian-led PIF interventions took place. 
Conclusion 
This section offers our conclusions both on the effectiveness and usefulness of the most 
advanced EWR mechanisms as well as on their application and non-application in regional 
organisations. Furthermore we will provide some policy recommendation since we conclude 
that the potential of such EWR models has not been fully realised. This sub-optimal 
implementation leads not only to wasting of scarce resources but also to unsatisfactory results 
in conflict prevention. 
Effectiveness and Usefulness of EWR Mechanisms 
The richness of the various models of EWR is impressive. At the same time, looking at the 
large number of various data collections, conflict predictions and assessments, there is a 
considerable duplication and overlap of effort. The methodologies of data collection, 
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identification of relevant indicators and prediction of conflict have greatly improved. For 
example, the predictive models developed by the PITF seem to have had considerable success 
over the last few years (Marshall 2008: 10). According to members of the PITF, the predictive 
power of their quantitative models has improved substantially and now lies at about 85 
percent. As Goldstone (2008: 7) argues, the overall accuracy of prediction can even be 
heightened if these models are combined with qualitative models based on structural 
analogies and patterns identified in case-study research. The future of predictive models thus 
seems to lie in a combination of indicator- and event-based quantitative analysis and 
qualitative/configurative analysis that relies on structural analogies and ‘common patterns’ 
among cases and might increase the precision of early warning up to 90 percent. 
But what does this imply for practitioners? Barton and von Hippel 2008 (11-12) stressed that 
political decision makers still have their reservations regarding the usefulness of forecasting 
models. We have identified five shortcomings: 
First, the difficult cases: Predictive models give precise forecasts regarding stable countries 
and fairly precise forecasts with regard to very unstable countries. But it is ‘difficult to be 
accurate on moderately stable countries, where actual conflict will depend most on whether 
precipitating events of a certain magnitude occur, which is inherently unpredictable.’ 
(Goldstone 2008: 3). Twenty percent of cases that are not predicted is quite a substantial 
number.  
Related to that point, Barton and von Hippel (2008) rightly state that there is still little 
knowledge about the impact of small events, which in some cases trigger the outbreak of 
major violence and in others do not. In most models the establishment of threshold criteria 
and ‘tipping points’ is ad hoc and not based on sufficiently explained procedures.  
Second, the causes of conflict: The correlation of selected indicators with violent conflict does 
not reveal causal chains and thus is of only limited relevance for intervention strategies. Let 
us assume that a country with high infant mortality, a hybrid regime and state discrimination 
is on the alert list. Would large-scale health programmes, political dialogue or a good 
governance programme and the threat of sanctions be conducive to early response? 
Third, the structural variables: Most of the models focus on short-term correlations and might 
under-estimate the relevance of structural variables and the possibilities of structural 
prevention, as Barton and von Hippel (2008: 10) have argued:  
‘Poverty, human rights, demographics, displacement, education, and health are 
important factors for anticipating instability in a long-term time frame yet 
relatively few models rely on indicators in these categories. This observation 
suggests the models are geared towards near term crises rather than predicting 
long term trends.’  
Fourth, the local space: Since most of the models, as well as the risk and capacity 
assessments, rely on quantitative data available over long time frames, questions of civil 
society development, participation or local governance and dispute resolution are not 
adequately incorporated and tested. If that led to a consolidated performance rating, it might 
easily replace less advanced assessments systems used by governmental and inter-
governmental agencies. 
Fifth, the possibility for replication: It needs to be emphasised that most of the models and 
mechanisms still do not clearly spell out under what conditions they can be regarded as 
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effective. The different projects should spell out more clearly the conditions, time horizons 
and criteria under which their validity could be put to test. 
The rationale of most early warning systems is that international actors (the UN, regional 
organisations, coalitions of the willing, neighbouring states etcetera) will react when 
information about potential of violent conflict becomes available. However, is the assumption 
of the need for dissemination of information realistic? It has been pointed out in the literature 
that those likely to be affected by conflict have to be warned. We want to stress that early 
warning systems have to define clearly whom they are going to alert, based on which 
assumptions they expect early and effective response to be initiated and whom they are trying 
to address in a system of multi-level governance where the populations affected are located in 
local environments and deserve to be more than ‘objects’ of prevention, but rather ‘partners’ 
and ‘subjects’. 
Hesitations to Engage in Early Response: explaining the ‘Warning-Response Gap’ 
There are several general reasons why a ‘warning-response gap’ is so apparent in many 
conflicts: shortcomings of the EWR models, structural disconnects between early warning 
advisors and early-response decision makers, political interests and inefficient use of scarce 
resources. 
1. Institutional rigidity and cognitive biases 
As we showed above, conflict-escalation processes and in particular the role of triggers and 
single events is still under-researched. While structural indicators fit into relatively simple 
models, the escalation of a tense situation into violence ‘does not result from the linear 
summation of a neatly defined set of causes, but from interactions among multiple phenomena 
in a complex system with several levels of organization’ (Meier 2007). Complexity science 
argues that organisations have to adapt to the structures of their environments, e.g. by 
introducing more flexible decision-making structures and feedback mechanisms that increase 
the resilience of the organisation and institutionalise learning processes. Against this 
background, Meier (2007) argues that most EWR mechanisms are still based on ‘hierarchical 
structures’ that cannot adequately cope with non-linear developments. In this view, the 
‘warning-response gap’ could be reduced by establishing hybrid hierarchies and networked 
governance mechanisms within EWR mechanisms. This could denote that certain events may 
trigger the establishment of ad hoc task forces as well as consultation mechanisms that ensure 
that the information and possible conclusions do not get lost in predefined decision-making 
channels. It would also mean that at certain stages EWR mechanisms must address not only a 
vaguely defined ‘international community’, but find ways to inform different levels of 
potential actors all the way down to the local level. 
Lawrence Woocher (2008) has added another dimension. According to his research, more 
accurate models and a change in communication and organisations’ structures will not suffice 
– because they do not reflect the ways in which individuals and groups process information 
and make decisions in the shadow of risk and uncertainty. Most EWR models are still based 
on the prevalent ‘rational actor’ model. This model, however, does not take into account that 
individuals and groups are prone to ‘mental errors caused by our simplified information 
processing strategies’ (Heuer, 1999: 111, cited by Woocher 2008: 5). Among these cognitive 
biases, the following may in particular influence the response (Woocher 2008: 10-17): 
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• If people face risk, they will tend to refer to existing experiences and patterns 
(‘availability heuristic’) and try to relate situations to well-known reference points. This 
makes it difficult to adequately assess new unforeseen phenomena; 
• If an alert is coupled with a lack of available options for early action, the resulting 
cognitive dissonance (Festinger 1957) may be mitigated by simply adjusting the alert 
level downwards;  
• Human beings tend to assume that causes and effects stem from similar categories. They 
are thus not prepared to react appropriately towards accidental or unintentional effects;  
• Human beings tend to neglect the extent of negative events because ‘moral feelings’ do 
not work with numbers. A mass catastrophe may even result in inactiveness (psychic 
numbing), because the sheer number will negatively influence the ‘capacity to experience 
affect, the positive and negative feelings that combine with reasoned analysis to guide our 
judgments, decisions, and actions’ (Slovic 2007). 
The arguments above suggest that the effectiveness of EWR systems is affected not only by 
the quality of alerts but also by institutional factors and ‘cognitive biases’. This means 
institutional learning processes are required and ‘de-biasing strategies’ must be designed, such 
as a formulating ‘attractive’ policy options, e.g. framing them as investments with a high and 
immediate turnout or as tool to substantially reduce losses (Woocher 2008: 21). 
2. The disconnect between early warning advisors and early action decision makers 
Even if an early warning system is accurate and timely it does not automatically lead to timely 
action. Nathan (2007: 50) convincingly argues that  
‘[a]bove all, it must be useful to the senior officials who are responsible for 
making decisions on early action. The system will have scant value if its outputs 
are not tailored precisely to meet their needs.’ 
 The various decision makers who deal with governance and human rights abuses, 
reconstruction programmes, mediation in conflicts, deployment of peacekeepers, planning and 
implementation of humanitarian and military programmes or preventive diplomacy – all of 
whom are engaged in peace and security missions – need tailor-made information rather than 
general reports on the potential emergence of violent conflict. Specific information for each 
conflict is required. Nathan (2007) identifies four reasons for the disconnect between early 
warning advisors and early-response decision makers: (1) the different level of seniority (the 
early warning advisors are often middle-level officials or external academic advisors); (2) the 
decision makers often prefer to rely on their own sources of information; (3) the decision 
makers lack of time and their overload with contradictory information; and (4) the 
confidentiality of some information and their political sensitivity.    
3. Political interests 
Our summary of the key features of the five regional organisations described above illustrates 
how greatly the organisations’ approach towards EWR varies. The most obvious difference, 
of course, is that the three African regional and sub-regional organisations that we analyse 
have strongly subscribed (at least on paper) to the implementation of EWR mechanisms while 
ASEAN and ARF have expressly abstained from establishing such an instrument. The PIF is 
in the beginning of a process that could lead to the establishment of an EWR system. 
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Table 2 takes a broader view and summarises the regional and sub-regional conflict 
management potential, including EWR mechanisms. The mandates, with certain reservations 
in ASEAN and ARF, of the regional organisations to act on behalf of the promotion of peace 
are quite clear and specific (AU, ECOWAS, IGAD, PIF). Organs or instruments have been 
established, military capacities are being build up in the case of the AU, ECOWAS and 
IGAD. However, they are partly only on paper, particularly in the case of IGAD. There seems 
to be a glaring lack of adequate non-military capacities to intervene in order to prevent or end 
conflict. 
Table 2: Summary of the regional and sub-regional conflict management potential 
 AU ECOWAS/ ECOMOG IGAD ASEAN/ARF PIF 
Mandate 
Intervention under 
grave 
circumstances: (1) 
war crimes, 
genocide, crimes 
against humanity; 
and (2) upon 
request of a 
member state to 
restore peace and 
security 
Intervention: 
violent conflict, 
humanitarian 
threats, 
sub-regional 
destabilisation, 
serious/massive 
human rights 
violations, 
overthrow of 
democratically 
elected 
governments 
Assist member 
states to 
maintain peace 
and security  
Non-intervention,  
confidence 
building, 
preventive 
diplomacy 
Non-
interference; 
assistance to 
member states 
Organs Peace and Security Council 
Mediation and 
Security Council 
No peace 
organ No peace organ 
No peace 
organ; 
dialogue 
forum 
Military 
capacities 
Military Staff 
Committee; five 
regional brigades 
Department of 
Defense, 
ECOMOG 
Regional 
brigade None None 
Non-
military 
capacities 
Preventive 
diplomacy: Panel 
of the Wise 
Wide spectrum of 
incentives and 
sanctions 
Field monitors, 
country 
coordinators, 
national 
research 
institutes,  
IGAD Partners 
Forum 
Conflidence-
building measures 
forum  and 
preventive 
diplomacy 
Ministerial 
action groups; 
eminent 
persons 
group; third 
party 
mediation 
Funding 
Africa Peace Fund, 
jointly funded by 
AU and EU 
Funding 
difficulties for the 
OMC 
Rapid 
Response 
Fund, 
CERWARN is 
funded by 
member states, 
GTZ and 
USAID 
Member states 
Multilateral 
and bilateral 
donors 
EWR 
Continental Early 
Warning System 
(CEWS) 
Type D EWR 
model 
Observation and 
Monitoring Centre 
(OMC), WANEP 
and four 
observation and 
monitoring zones 
Type D and E 
EWR model 
Conflict Early 
Warning and 
Response  
(CEWARN); 
conflict-EWR 
units  
Type B and D 
EWR model 
None 
Research 
Programme 
on Conflicts; 
no 
functioning 
EWR 
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The three organisations that have engaged fully in establishing EWR systems, namely the 
AU, ECOWAS and IGAD, have chosen mixed models, which, however, strongly relate to 
already existing models with proven academic and practical background.  
Two problems are obvious. First, given the vastness of the regions covered by the 
organisations and the enormous problems in the broadly defined area of peace and security, 
particularly human security, a large number of staff is needed at the local, national, sub-
regional and regional level to adequately collect data and report on emerging conflicts. 
However, these staffs are not available in any of the existing systems (CEWS, 
WARN/WANEP and CEWARN). Capacities are still extremely limited. Secondly, Souaré 
(2007: 106) has pointed at ECOWAS member states’ deficiencies in governance: 
‘[…] it is not clear whether these zonal bureaux [of the ECOWAS EWR system] 
will be able to achieve their intended goals under the current regime of 
observation and monitoring systems. It is unlikely that civil servants loyal to an 
undemocratic regime will be able to effectively monitor and report human rights 
situations, press freedom and civil–military relations in their country or its allies.’ 
This quotation points to a fundamental problem that is not unique to West Africa. Usually, 
governments are quite aware of acute or emerging major conflicts. Often they themselves are 
the cause of this conflict. Sophisticated early warning indicators are not needed to warn about 
such conflicts. However, governments are usually not interested in the fact that their abuses of 
civil rights and the violation of human rights are documented or acted upon. Thus, despite 
mandating secretariats of regional organisations, this might only be lip service. In practice, 
certain governments make sure that the relevant regional bodies remain weak in early 
warning, thereby preventing early response. 
We described above that regional organisations do have a strong interest in prevention and de-
escalation of conflict in the region. But the methods used to achieve this vary. ASEAN and 
ARF have chosen a consultative and consensus-based approach that avoids bringing mutually 
exclusive positions on conflict-mediating mechanism among members into the public space. 
This has led to inactivity in solving regional conflicts but at the same time to a gradual 
development of regionalism.  
IGAD, in contrast, although also a region compromised by conflicts, has chosen a different 
approach. Due to the political and security situation IGAD was not in a position to develop a 
functioning and effective region-wide EWR concept. As a compromise, IGAD presently 
restricts its fully developed indicator and report-based EWR to two pilot areas, both involving 
cross-border local level conflicts. This political compromise has both costs and benefits. 
Certainly, the declared intention of the EWR system of predicting violent conflict cannot be 
met. This would require a region-wide approach. Thus, numerous conflicts and tensions with 
a potential to turn into violent conflict remain unobserved and unreported by the official 
IGAD CEWARN system. However, the concentration on two local cross-border conflicts has 
the advantage of collecting the relevant information at the local level. Thus, the strong 
criticism against many EWR models, of largely ignoring the strength of the local space in 
mediating conflict, is of less relevance in the case of IGAD’s two pilot projects. 
4. Inefficient allocation and use of resources 
Our analysis has shown that the field of EWR is characterised by a striking duplication and 
overlap of data collection in numerous different models. In particular, we have witnessed an 
‘inflation’ of relatively closely related capacity and risk-assessment models within the last 
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few years – be it in the more academic context of ratings and performance rankings or among 
agencies with an interest in concrete risk analysis for their field work and/or early response. 
At the same time, there is a remarkable gap – not only between warning and response, but 
also between the high ambitions and far-reaching goals of EWR projects and the status of 
their actual implementation. This gap is not least mirrored in the relatively poorly developed 
early warning systems of the AU and ECOWAS that obviously need more than time to fully 
materialise. Besides political and bureaucratic hurdles, a major factor could be the pre-
dominance of institutional logics of international organisations that prefer the establishment 
of their ‘own’ systems – even though that leads to the misallocation of human and financial 
resources and to the high transaction costs that result from complicated coordination 
procedures.  
Instead, the focus could be on the consolidation of advanced models, the intensified sharing of 
data collections (despite academic competition and political barriers) and the public provision 
of relevant information. This would not only increase efficiency in the field, but would also 
broaden the scope of user groups of early warning systems and would enable advocates of 
early warning to inform in due course the people affected. Advanced predictive models, as 
currently developed by the PITF, should become accessible to the public or at least available 
to relevant organisations. Newly established or planned EWR systems could thus make use of 
existing systems instead of reinventing the wheel. This would enable the allocation of scarce 
resources to: a) the event-based and actor-oriented analysis of escalation processes and the 
development of scenarios and alternative response strategies that take into account possible 
cognitive biases; and b) monitoring the local space that has so far been mainly neglected by 
the larger research projects.  
Taking this fact into account, research grants in the field of EWR should set a priority on the 
consolidation of existing models and findings with a focus on transparency, availability and 
connectivity towards regional and local EWRS. At the same time, development assistance to 
regional organisations should refrain from investing in the establishment of completely new 
systems and instead encourage their partners in crisis regions to capitalise on existing 
information pools, networking and cooperative learning. Thus the monitoring and assessment 
of local events and the policy-oriented formulation of scenarios and plausible as well as 
feasible response strategies could become the core task of regional EWR mechanisms.  
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Appendix 1 – Early Warning and Response with regard to Violent Conflict and State 
Fragility: An Overview on Models, Tools and Mechanisms 
Sources: Nyheim 2008, Marshall 2008 (CPA), Barton and von Hippel 2008 (CSIS); own research and 
compilation 
ACAD  Academic 
GOV  Governmental 
IGO  International Governmental Organisation 
INGO  International Non-governmental Organisation 
NGO  Non-governmental Organisation 
PRIV  Private Organisation 
 
Institution / Lead Researchers 
Classification (ACAD, GOV, IGO, INGO, 
NGO, PRIV) 
a. Name of the Model 
b. URL Link 
c. Major publications (e.g. Fearon/Laitin 2003) 
A. Conditional and Causal Factor Models (with predictive qualities/implications) 
Minorities at Risk Project, Center for 
International Development and Conflict 
Management (CIDCM) / Ted R. Gurr 
ACAD 
a. Ethnic rebellion model 
b. http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/mar/ 
c. Adelmann 1998; Ahmed and Kassinis 1998; 
Brecke 1998; Onishi 1998 
Political Instability Task Force5 (PITF), 
Center for Global Policy / Monty G. 
Marshall 
ACAD 
a. Internal Wars and Failures of Governance 1955-
2006 
b. http://globalpolicy.gmu.edu/pitf/ 
c. Esty et al. 1998; Bates et al. 2003; Goldstone et 
al. 2000 
Stanford University / James D. Fearon and 
David Laitin 
ACAD 
a. Civil War Model Horizontal Inequalities 
b. http://www.stanford.edu/group/ethnic/ 
c. Fearon and Laitin 2003 
World Bank Development Research Group 
and Oxford University / Paul Collier and 
Anke Hoeffler 
ACAD, IGO 
a. Greed model of rebellion (opportunity structures) 
b. http://econ.worldbank.org/programs/conflict  
c. Collier and Hoeffler 1998, 2001, 2002, 2004 
Yale University / Nicholas Sambanis 
ACAD 
a. Explanation of Ethnic Civil War 
b. http://pantheon.yale.edu/~ns237/ 
c. Elbadawi and Sambanis 2000; Sambanis 1999; 
Sambanis 2004 
B. Predictive Models 
Political Instability Task Force, Center for 
Global Policy / Monty G. Marshall 
ACAD 
a. PITF global model 
PITF African Instability  model 
b. http://globalpolicy.gmu.edu/pitf/pitfp5.htm 
c. Goldstone et al. 2005 
Political Instability Task Force, Center for 
Global Policy / Monty G. Marshall 
ACAD 
a. PITF Muslim countries model 
PITF ethnic war model 
b. http://globalpolicy.gmu.edu/pitf/pitfp5.htm 
c. Gurr, Woodward and Marshall 2005 
Political Instability Task Force, Center for 
Global Policy / Monty G. Marshall 
ACAD 
a. PITF autocratic and democratic transition models  
b. http://globalpolicy.gmu.edu/pitf/pitfp5.htm 
c. Ulfelder and Lustig 2005 
Political Instability Task Force, Center for 
Global Policy / Monty G. Marshall 
ACAD 
a. PITF genocide-politicide model 
b. http://globalpolicy.gmu.edu/genocide/ 
c. Harff 2003 
d.  
                                                 
5 The Political Instability Task Force (PITF) was formerly known as State Failure Task Force. 
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United States Army Center for Army 
Analysis (CAA) Fort Belvoir Virginia / 
Sean O'Brien 
GOV 
a. Analyzing complex threats for operations and 
readiness (ACTOR) 
b. http://www.dtic.mil/srch/doc?collection=t2&id=A
DA399370  
c. O'Brien 2001 
C. Risk and Capacity Assessments (Rankings and Performance Ratings) 
Center for International Development and 
Conflict Managment/ Center for Systemic 
Peace, University of Maryland / Monty 
Marshall and Ted R. Gurr 
ACAD 
a. Peace and Conflict Ledger  
b. http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/pc/chapter02/  
c. Hewitt, Wilkenfeld and Gurr 2008 
Center for Systemic Peace, George Mason 
University, USA / Jack Goldstone and 
Monty Marshall 
ACAD 
a. State Fragility Index 
Global Report 
b. http://www.systemicpeace.org/ 
c. Marshall and Cole 2008 
Department for International Development 
(DFID), UK 
GOV 
a. Conducting Conflict Assessments 
b. http://www.dfid.gov.uk/Pubs/files/conflictassessm
entguidance.pdf 
c. Goodhand, Vaux and Walker 2002 
Department for International Development 
(DFID), UK 
GOV 
a. Country Governance Analysis 
b. http://www.dfid.gov.uk/Pubs/files/how-to-cga.pdf 
c. DFID 2008 
European Union 
GOV, IGO 
a. EC Checklist for Root Causes of Conflict 
b. http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/cfsp/cpcm/cp
.htm 
c. European Commission 2006 
German Federal Ministry for Economic Co-
operation and Development (BMZ), 
Germany / Eduard Westreicher  
GOV 
a. Assessment of Governance Level and Trend in the 
Development Orientation of Governments  
Public: Development-Oriented Transformation in 
Conditions of Fragile Statehood and poor 
Government Performance 
b. http://www.bmz.de/en/service/infothek/fach/konze
pte/konzept153.pdf 
c. BMZ 2007 
Sector Project Crisis Prevention and 
Conflict Transformation, Deutsche 
Gesellschaft für Technische 
Zusammenarbeit (GTZ) / Uwe Kievelitz, 
Katharina Hübner-Schmidt and Nina Scherg 
GOV 
a. Conflict Analysis for Project Planning and 
Management 
b. http://www.gtz.de/en/themen/uebergreifende-
themen/krisenpraevention/4091.htm 
c. Leonhardt 2001 
The Brookings Institution / Susan E. Rice 
and Stewart Patrick 
ACAD, NGO 
a. Index of State Weakness in the Developing World 
b. http://www.brookings.edu/reports/2008/02_weak_
states_index.aspx 
c. Rice and Patrick 2008 
The Fund for Peace and Foreign Policy  
ACAD, NGO 
d. Failed States Index, based on the Conflict 
Assessment System Tool (CAST) 
e. http://www.fundforpeace.org/web/index.php?optio
n=com_content&task=view&id=99&Itemid=140 
f. Fund for Peace 2008 
United States Agency for International 
Development, Tulane University / Stanley 
Samarasinghe 
GOV, ACAD 
 
 
a. Conflict Risk Analysis and Vulnerability Analysis 
b. http://www.certi.org/themes/conflict_RA_VA.htm 
c. Samarasinghe, Donaldson and McGinn 1999 
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Vision of Humanity / Steve Killelea 
ACAD, NGO 
a. The Global Peace Index 
b. http://www.visionofhumanity.org/gpi/home.php 
c. Institute for Economics & Peace 2008 
World Bank / Shonali Sardesai and Per 
Wam 
IO 
a. Conflict Analysis Framework (CAF) 
b. http://go.worldbank.org/3QZPKY2XU0 
c. World Bank 2002 
D. Risk and Capacity Assessments with Early Response Component (event analysis)  
African Union (AU) 
IGO 
a. Continental Early Warning System (CEWS)  
b. http://www.africa-
union.org/root/AU/AUC/Departments/PSC/PSC/ 
c. African Union Commission 2008; Cilliers 2005 
Carleton University, Canadian Government 
/ Gerald Cosette 
ACAD, GOV 
d. Country Indicators for Foreign Policy (CIFP)  
e. http://www.carleton.ca/cifp/ 
f. Country Indicators for Foreign Policy 2008 
CEEAC (IGO) a. Mechanisme d’Alerte Rapide pour l’Afrique 
Centrale (MARAC)  
b. http://www.delcaf.ec.europa.eu/fr/ue_et_afrique_c
entrale/documents/DSC_PIR_2003_2007.pdf 
Clingendael Institute (Netherlands), 
Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs / 
Luc van de Goor 
ACAD, GOV  
a. Conflict and Policy Assessment Framework  
The Stability Assessment Framework 
b. http://www.clingendael.nl/cscp/  
c. van de Goor and Verstegen 2000; Verstegen, van 
de Goor and de Zeeuw 2005 
Department for International Development 
(DFID), UK 
GOV 
a. Scenario and Contingency Planning for Fragile 
States  
b. http://www.dfid.gov.uk/pubs/files/departmental-
report/2008/Chapter8.pdf 
ECOWAS 
IGO 
a. ECOWAS Early Warning and Early Response 
Network (ECOWARN) 
b. http://ecowarn.org/ 
European Commission / SWP / others  
IGO, ACAD  
a. Conflict Prevention Network (CPN) 
Forum on Early Warning and Early 
Response (FEWER), UK  
INGO 
a. Conflict Analysis and Response Definition 
b. http://www.fewer-international.org/index.html 
c. FEWER (1999); FEWER (2003) 
FEWER-Africa (Kenya): Ituri Watch 
(Democratic Republic of Congo) 
INGO 
a. Early Warning and Early Response 
b. http://www.fewer-
international.org/pages/africa/projects_14.html 
c. FEWER (1999); FEWER (2003); Nobleza/Nyheim 
(2000) 
FEWER-Eurasia (Russia): FEWER-Eurasia 
Network 
INGO 
a. Early Warning and Early Response 
b. http://www.fewer-
international.org/pages/eurasia/index.html 
c. FEWER (1999); FEWER (2003) 
German Federal Ministry for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (BMZ), 
German Institute of Global and Area 
Studies, Hamburg (GIGA) and Institute for 
Development and Peace, Duisburg (INEF) / 
Angelika Spelten 
GOV, ACAD 
a. Spelten Model 
An Indicator Model for Use as an Additional 
Instrument for Planning and Analysis in 
Development Co-operation (1998) 
b. http://www.idrc.ca/uploads/user-
S/10596649641conflict-sensitivedevelop.pdf  
c. Gaigals and Leonhard 2001: 62 
Intergovernmental Authority on 
Development (IGAD) 
IGO 
a. Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism 
(CEWARN) 
b. http://www.cewarn.org/  
c. IGAD 2002 
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SwissPeace, Virtual Research Associates, 
VRA Knowledge Manager  
NGO, ACAD 
a. Early Recognition and Analysis of Tensions 
(FAST) 
b. http://www.swisspeace.org/fast/ 
c. Swisspeace 2006 
United Nations Development Programme 
(UNDP), Bureau for Crisis Prevention and 
Recovery 
IGO 
a. Conflict-Related Development Analysis (CDA) 
b. http://www.undp.org/cpr/  
c. UNDP 2003 
United Nations Development Programme 
(UNDP) 
IGO 
a. Regional Early Warning System for Southeastern 
Europe (REWS-SEE) 
b. http://earlywarning.undp.sk/ 
http://www.ks.undp.org/ 
c. UNDP SEE 2006 
United Nations Development Programme 
(UNDP) 
IGO 
a. Country-level early warning systems in Ghana, 
Kenya, Ukraine (Crimea), Bolivia (PAPEP), 
Balkans, Kyrgyzstan 
United States Agency for International 
Development (USAID) / Bureau for 
Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian 
Assistance/Office of Conflict Management 
and Mitigation (DCHA/CMM) (GOV) 
a. i. Conflict Assessment Framework (2004)  
ii. Conflict and Fragility Alert,. Consultation and 
Tracking System (C/FACTS) (2005) / Fragile 
States Indicators (2006) 
iii.  
b. i. USAID (2004) 
ii. ARD (2005) Nathan Associates Inc. (2006) 
United States Agency for International 
Development (USAID) / Military Affairs 
a. Tactical Conflict Assessment Framework (2006) 
b.  http://www.usaid.gov/our_work/ 
global_partnerships/ma/tcaf.html  
West Africa Network for Peace-building 
(WANEP)  
a. Early Warning and Response Network (WARN) 
b. http://www.wanep.org/aboutwanep.htm 
E. Crisis Watch Lists based on Investigative Case Study Research or Intelligence  
Business Environment Risk Intelligence 
S.A. (BERI) / Bruno Hake 
PRIV 
 
a. Historical Research Ratings Package (HRRP), 
b. http://www.beri.com/hrrp.asp 
c. Barton and von Hippel 2008; BERI 2006 
Control Risks Group (CRG)  
PRIV 
 
a. Ratings, Control Risks 
b. http://www.crg.com/Default.aspx?page=0  
c. Barton and von Hippel 2008; Markwick 2001: 367 
Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) / John 
Bowler 
PRIV 
 
a. Country Risk Service (CRS) 
b. http://www.eiu.com/site_info.asp?info_name=ps_c
ountry_risk_service&entry1=psNav 
c. Barton and von Hippel 2008; Howell 2001: 367 
IHS Energy Group /Jerre L. Stead 
PRIV 
a. Political Risk Ratings and Rankings Index 
b. http://energy.ihs.com/Products/Peps/ratingsandran
kings.htm  
c. Barton and von Hippel 2008; Hallmark and 
Whited 2001 
International Crisis Group, Belgium 
PRIV 
a. Crisis Watch 
b. http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=12
00&l=1 
International Risk Approach 
PRIV 
 
a. International Risk 
b. http://www.intlrisk.com/pdf/factsheets/pbras-
eng.pdf  
PRS Group 
PRIV 
 
a. International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) 
b. http://www.prsgroup.com/icrg/riskdata.html 
c. Barton and von Hippel 2008; Howell 2001 
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STRATFOR.Com 
PRIV 
 
a. Commercial geopolitical intelligence service, 
providing: 
* Situational Awareness 
* Analysis 
* Forecasts 
b. http://www.stratfor.com/ 
United States Government, National 
Intelligence Council (NIC) 
GOV 
 
a. Instability Watch List 
National Intelligence Estimates (NIE) 
b. http://www.dni.gov/nic/NIC_specialproducts.html  
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Appendix 2 – Indicators of the CEWARN system of IGAD 
Source: CEWARN Unit 2006: 40-41. 
1. Description of CEWARN Indicators: Situation Reports 
 
Alliance Formation 
Inter-ethnic group alliance  Ethnic group – government alliance 
 
Armed Intervention 
Internal armed support  External armed support 
 
Behavioural Aggravators 
Interrupt other activities  Pastoral migration   Bullets as commodities 
Development aid problems  Harmful migration policy  Protest 
Media controls   Harmful livestock policy  Student attendance interrupted 
Migrant labourers   Influx of IDPs   Separation of groups 
New Markets    Security escorts   Livestock prices dropped 
Negative media coverage  Small arms availability  Post-raid blessing 
Livestock sales increase 
 
Environmental Pressure 
Natural disaster   Land competition   More livestock in secure areas 
Grazing areas abandoned  Livestock disease 
 
Exchange Behaviour 
Celebration    Inter-group marriage   Gift offering 
Inter-group sharing   Cross-border trade 
 
Mitigating Behaviour 
Access to health care   Relief distributions   Law enforcement 
Small arms disclosure  Markets remain open   Bride price stable 
Access to education   Positive media coverage  Negotiations taking place 
 
Peace Initiatives 
Women peace messengers  Weapons reduction program  Local peace initiatives 
Religious peace building  NGO peace initiatives 
 
Triggering Behaviour 
All-male migration Pre-raid blessing Traditional forecasting 
 
2. Description of CEWARN Indicators: Violent Incident Reports 
 
Armed Clashes 
• Military Battle (Armed hostilities or engagements between an official military unit of a 
government and an armed party. Includes both civil war and inter-state war battles. 
• Other Armed Clashes (All other armed hostilities or engagements. Includes all communal 
and inter-communal battles. 
 
 
 
 
 37  
Raids 
• Raids with Abductions (Raids focused around abductions of people or the taking of hostages. 
May include injuries or death to humans, and/or damage, destruction or theft of other 
property). 
• Organised Raids (Other organised raids. May include injuries or deaths to humans, and/or 
damage, destruction or theft of other property). 
• Livestock Theft (Raids focused around the theft of livestock. May include injuries or death to 
humans, and/or damage, destruction or theft of other property. 
 
Protest Demonstrations 
• Peaceful Protests (peaceful protest demonstrations or assemblies. May include isolated or 
low-level violence). 
• Violent Turmoil or Riots (Assemblies or crowds that get out of control. Marked by violence, 
disorder, damage and/or destruction). 
 
Other Crime 
• Assaults (Physical attacks and abuse involving the actual use of physical force against 
individuals, and/or groups. Does not include abductions. 
• Banditry (Commandeering of vehicles, highway robbery, and other similar criminal 
activities). 
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Acronyms 
AMIB  African Union Mission in Burundi 
ARF  ASEAN Regional Forum 
ASF  African Standby Force 
ASEAN Association of South-East Asian Nations 
AU  African Union 
CEWARN Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism 
CEWS  Continental Early Warning System 
CIFP  Country Indicators for Foreign Policy Project 
EASBRIG Brigade of East Africa 
ECOBRIG Brigade of ECOWAS 
ECOMOG Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group 
ECOWARN  ECOWAS Warning and Response Network 
ECOWAS Economic Community of West African States 
EWR  Early Warning and Response 
FAST  Early Recognition and Analysis of Tensions 
FEWER Forum on Early Warning and Response 
FSI  Fragile States Index 
GTZ  German Technical Assistance Corporation 
ICG  International Crises Group 
IGAD  Intergovernmental Authority on Development in Eastern Africa  
OAU  Organisation of African Unity 
OMC   Observation and Monitoring Centre 
PIF  Pacific Island Forum 
PITF  Political Instability Task Force 
PSC  African Union Peace and Security Council 
SADC  Southern African Development Community 
SADCBRIG Brigade of SADC 
UNDP  United Nations Development Programme 
USAID United States Agency for International Development 
WANEP  West African Network for Peacebuilding 
WARN West Africa Early Warning Network 
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